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Article
A Critical Guide to Using the Legislative History of
the Fourteenth Amendment to Determine the
Amendment's Original Meaning
GREGORY E. MAGGS
Judges, lawyers, and scholars often look to the Fourteenth Amendment's
legislative history for evidence of the Amendment's original meaning. Members of
the Supreme Court, for instance, have cited floor statements, committee records,
preliminary proposals, and other documents relating to the drafting and approval
of the Fourteenth Amendment in many important cases. The documents containing
this legislative history, however, are difficult to use. As explained in this Article, the
Amendment came about through a complex process, in which Congress rejected
several prior proposals for constitutional amendments before settling on a markedly
different proposal that became the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the primary
sources containing the legislative history are widely available online, some of them
lack useful indexes and are only partially electronically searchable. In addition,
statements made during the drafting and debate over the Fourteenth Amendment do
not always yield clear answers to modern questions. Aggravating the situation, most
lawyers, judges, law clerks, and legal scholars receive little or no instruction on
how to use the documents containing the legislative history of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Accordingly, they may feel unequipped either to use the legislative
history to make claims about the Amendment's original meaning or to evaluate the
claims of others. Even the Supreme Court appears to have difficulty with the details.
This Article seeks to improve the situation by providing a critical guide to the
Amendment's legislative history.
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A Critical Guide to Using the Legislative History of
the Fourteenth Amendment to Determine the
Amendment's Original Meaning
GREGORY E. MAGGS *
INTRODUCTION

Judges, lawyers, and scholars often look to the Fourteenth
Amendment's legislative history for evidence of the Amendment's
original meaning. Members of the Supreme Court, for instance, have cited
floor statements, committee records, preliminary proposals, and other
documents relating to the drafting and approval of the Fourteenth
Amendment in at least twenty-five cases.' For example, in an extremely
influential dissent in Adamson v. California,' Justice Hugo Black relied on
statements made by Congressman John Bingham in concluding that "one
of the chief objects" of the Due Process Clause was "to make the Bill of
Rights, applicable to the states."' In his separate opinion in Oregon v.
Mitchell,' Justice John Marshall Harlan relied on various actions by the
congressional committee that proposed the Fourteenth Amendment in
concluding that Congress could not rely on its power to enforce the Equal
Protection Clause in enacting a law to lower the voting age in the states.'
More recently, in his separate opinion in McDonald v. City of Chicago,'
Justice Clarence Thomas relied on floor statements, committee reports,
and similar congressional sources in concluding that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required the Supreme
Court to invalidate a state law restricting gun ownership.' This reliance on
Professor of Law & Co-Director, National Security and U.S. Foreign Relations Law LL.M.
Program, The George Washington University Law School. The author thanks his research assistants
Frank Chang and Zachary Tyree for their many improvements to this Article and The George
Washington University Law School for a generous research grant that helped to complete this Article.
This is the sixth in a series of articles by the author on sources of the original meaning of the
Constitution. The five other articles are A Concise Guide to Using the Articles of Confederation to
Determine the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 397 (2017)
(forthcoming); A Concise Guide to Using Dictionaries from the Founding Era to Determine the
Original Meaning of the Constitution, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 358 (2014); A Concise Guide to the
Records of the Federal Constitutional Convention of 1787 as Evidence of the Original Meaning of the
US. Constitution, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1707 (2012); A Concise Guide to the Records of the State
Ratifying Conventions as a Source of the Original Meaning of the United States Constitution, 2009 U.
ILL. L. REV. 457 (2009); and A Concise Guide to the Federalist Papers as a Source of the Original
Meaning of the United States Constitution, 87 B.U. L. REV. 801 (2007).
The author conducted a Westlaw search of the Supreme Court database using the search term
"adv: '39th Cong!' /40 (14th or Fourteenth)" and individually reviewed the cases identified.
2 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
3 Id. at 71-72 (Black, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
4 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
5 Id. at 154-55 (Harlan, .1., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
6 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
7 Id. at 805-06, 827 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment is not new; courts
have referred to it continuously since the Amendment's adoption.'
Interest in the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment is not
limited to the courts either. For example, in the 2016 presidential election
campaign, proponents and opponents of birthright citizenship looked to
statements by members of the 39th Congress in 1866 about whether the
first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment makes anyone born in the
United States automatically a U.S. citizen.' Academic writers, meanwhile,
recently have argued about what the legislative history of the Fourteenth
Amendment says with respect to issues such as same sex-marilage,lo
affirmative action,' and even the recent brinksmanship between Congress
and the President in setting the federal budget.'
The documents containing the legislative history of the Fourteenth
Amendment are difficult to use. As explained in this Article, the
Amendment came about through a complex process, in which Congress
rejected several prior proposals for constitutional amendments before
settling on a markedly different proposal that became the Fourteenth
Amendment.13 Although the primary sources containing the legislative
history are widely available online, some of them lack useful indices and
are only partially electronically searchable. In addition, statements made
during the drafting and debate over the Fourteenth Amendment do not
always yield clear answers to modem questions.
Aggravating the situation, most lawyers, judges, law clerks, and legal
scholars receive little or no instruction on how to use the documents
containing the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (U.S.) 36, 67 (1872) ("The most cursory glance at [the
three Amendments added after the Civil War] discloses a unity of purpose, when taken in connection
with the history of the times, which cannot fail to have an important bearing on any question of doubt
concerning . . . their true meaning. Nor can such doubts, when any reasonably exist, be safely and
rationally solved without a reference to that history . . ."); Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 5-8
(1949) (discussing the willingness of Supreme Court justices to "make decisions turn upon their
reading of the historical record [sic]" in the context of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence).
See Mark Pulliam, What Did the 14th Amendment Congress Think about 'Birthright
Citizenship '?, AM. SPECTATOR (Aug. 24, 2015, 12:54 PM), http://spectator.org/63860 what-did-14thamendment-congress-think-about-birthright-citizenship/ (crediting Donald Trump for "advancing a
national conversation on a critically important issue").
See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Hannah M. Begley, Originalism and Same Sex Marriage, 70
U. MIAMI L. REV. 648, 651-52 (2016) ("We think these sources all suggest that just as the word
`person' in the Due Process Clause protects LGBTQ people, so too does the word 'person' in the Equal
Protection Clause.").
II See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, Original Intent and the Fourteenth Amendment: Into the Black Hole
of Constitutional Law, 89 CU -KENT L. REV. 1019, 1028 (2014) ("Some scholars and lawyers have
sought a 'true' and certain original meaning of the Amendment, often with a self-conscious political
agenda to undermine integration, affirmative action, and even substantive racial fairness.").
12 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Legislative History of Section Four of the Fourteenth
Amendment, BALKINIZATION (June 30, 2011), hftp://ballcin.blogspot.com/2011/06/legislative-historyof-section-four-ofhtml ("[T]he language of the Amendment went beyond this particular historical
concern. It was stated broad terms in order to prevent future majorities in Congress from repudiating
the federal debt to gain political advantage . . .").
11 See infra Section
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Accordingly, they may feel unequipped either to use the legislative history
to make claims about the Amendment's original meaning or to evaluate
the claims of others. Even the Supreme Court appears to have difficulty
with the details.' This Article seeks to improve the situation by providing
a critical guide to the Amendment's legislative history.
The remainder of this Article consists of five sections. Section I
describes the primary sources containing the legislative history of the
Fourteenth Amendment, all of which are now available on the Internet for
free. Section II provides background for understanding the concerns that
prompted Congress to seek a constitutional amendment. Section III
describes various proposals for constitutional amendments that the 39th
Congress considered, beginning with House Resolution ("H. Res.") No. 9,
which addressed only Confederate debts, and culminating in House
Resolution No. 127, which ultimately became the Fourteenth Amendment.
Section IV discusses different definitions of the term "original meaning"
and explains that legislative history is useful mostly for showing the
original intent of Congress as opposed to other types of original meaning.
Section V identifies and discusses five typical ways in which writers rely
on the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment in making claims
about its original meaning. Section VI then discusses three general
problems to avoid in using legislative history. The Article then states a
brief conclusion: jurists and scholars can and should use the legislative
history of the Fourteenth Amendment to make certain kinds of claims
about its original meaning but must exercise caution and recognize the
limits of their claims.
This Article also contains three appendices. Appendix A contains the
text of the Fourteenth Amendment and other proposed constitutional
amendments that Congress considered in 1865 and 1866. Appendix B
provides a timeline of the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Appendix C provides a table identifying the members of Congress who
made speeches concerning the proposed constitutional amendments.
Before going further, three limitations require mention. First, this
Article uses the term "legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment"
to refer only to congressional records revealing how the House, Senate,
and the Joint Committee on Reconstruction drafted and considered
proposals leading to the Fourteenth Amendment. This Article does not
cover the records of the state legislatures that ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment.' Those records are important, but must be the subject for a
14 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (describing H.R. Res. 63 as the
"first draft" of the Fourteenth Amendment when it was in fact one of several proposals that Congress
considered but rejected before it drafted, amended, and approved H.R. Res. 127, which became the
Fourteenth Amendment).
Is The process by which the state legislatures approved and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment
was controversial. See, e.g., Douglas H. Bryant, Unorthodox and Paradox: Revisiting the Ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 53 ALA. L. REV. 555, 555-59 (2002) (describing and questioning the
legitimacy of the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification). The issues involved are beyond the scope of
this Article, which concerns only what happened in Congress.
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different article.
Second, this Article addresses only the question of how the legislative
history of the Fourteenth Amendment might provide evidence of the
Amendment's original meaning. It makes no claims about when or
whether courts should or must follow that original meaning. Other works
thoroughly address that question!' Suffice it to say, researchers may wish
to use the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment to discover the
Amendment's original meaning even if they do not believe the original
meaning should determine the outcome of contemporary cases.
Third, this guide primarily explains how to use sources of the
legislative history to determine the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment. It makes no substantive claims about what the legislative
history shows with respect to particular disputed issues. For example, it
does not purport to resolve questions such as whether the Fourteenth
Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause protects a right to possess
firearms or whether the Due Process Clause guarantees a liberty of
contract. Instead, this guide seeks to help others make or evaluate
substantive claims of this type.
I. PRIMARY SOURCES OF THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Researchers can find most of the legislative history of the Fourteenth
Amendment in six primary sources, all of which are available on the
Internet for free. The following discussion describes these sources and
how to access them.
A. Volume 36 of the Congressional Globe
The 39th Congress drafted and approved the Fourteenth Amendment
during its first session, which ran from December 4, 1865, through July
28, 1866.17 Volume 36 of the Congressional Globe contains a transcription
of the floor debates in Congress during this period!' The Supreme Court,
accordingly, has cited Volume 36 in numerous Fourteenth Amendment
decisions.19 Researchers can access Volume 36 online without cost at the
Library of Congress's Century of Lawmaking website.' Unfortunately,
except for the indices, the online version is not stored in an electronically
16 See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 13- 9 (2d ed. 1997) (arguing that the courts should interpret the Fourteenth

Amendment according to its original meaning); Thomas B. Colby, Originalism and the Ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 107 Nw. U.L. REV. 1627, 1629 -30 (2013) (arguing that the case for
following the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is weaker than arguments for following
the original meaning in the rest of the Constitution because of the highly controversial manner in which
the states ratified the Amendment).
17 For the dates upon which the 39th Congress convened and adjourned, see Congressional
Globe: Debate and Proceedings, 1833-73, LIBR. OF CONG., http://www.memory.loc.gov/
ammem/amlaw/Iwcglink.html [https:l/perma.cc/EV4N-V879] (last visited Jan. 29, 2017). Prior to its
"first" session, Congress also met in a "special session" from March 4, 1865 to March 11, 1865. Id.
18 id.
19
20

See supra note 1 (describing Westlaw search).
17.

LIBR. OF CONG., supra note
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searchable format.
The Congressional Globe is an accurate and reliable source. It was a
non-partisan journal funded and published by Francis Preston Blair and
John C. Rives from 1833 until 1873, with funding from the Senate starting
in 1848 and funding from the House starting in 1850.21 Its goal was to
report all Congressional floor debates, much like the Congressional
Record does today.' The Congressional Globe started the practice of
"printing debates as first-person narratives rather than third-person
summations."' In addition, despite the lack of electronic recording
equipment in the 1860s, the Congressional Globe achieved almost
verbatim accounts of the floor debates by employing "a corps of reporters
trained in the latest stenographic techniques."'
Starting in 1865, the Congressional Globe was published on a daily
basis.' Each member of Congress received twenty-four copies.26
Accordingly, the Congressional Globe was widely available almost
immediately after every debate. The debates over the Fourteenth
Amendment were therefore neither secret nor difficult for interested
outsiders to follow.
Volume 36 of the Congressional Globe contains four parts relevant to
researching the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment: the main
body of the volume, the index to the main body, the appendix, and the
index to the appendix. The main body, which occupies pages 1 to 4,312,
contains the Senate and House debates from the entire first session. In
these pages, readers can learn exactly what congressional leaders said
about proposals to amend the Constitution. For example, on May 23, 1866,
Senator John Howard famously gave a section-by-section explanation of
H.R. Res. 127, the five-part joint resolution that ultimately became the
Fourteenth Amendment.'
The 104-page index to the main body of Volume 36 is located on
21 Historical Events, BLAIR HOUSE, http://vvww.blairhouse.org/history/historical-events/globeand-congressional-globe [https://perma.ec/BP6T-8RAS] (last visited Jan. 29, 2017); Reporters of
Debate and the Congressional Record, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/
history/common/briefing/Reporters _Debate Congressional_Record.htm [https://perma.cc/2GDGNTHY] (last visited Feb. 5, 2017) [hereinafter SENATE REPORTERS OF DEBATE].
22 See An Overview of the Congressional Record and Its Predecessor Publications: A Research
Guide, L. LIBR. SOC'Y OF WASH., D.C., http://wwwilsdc.org/congressional-record-overview
[https://perma.cc/R2S7-AN26] (last updated Jan. 2016) [hereinafter Overview of Congressional
Publications] ("The Congressional Record contains House and Senate floor proceedings, substantially
verbatim transcripts of floor debates and remarks, notice of all bills introduced, full text of all
conference committee reports, notices of committee and Presidential actions and communications, and
statements or documents submitted by members of Congress for publication.").
23 SENATE REPORTERS OF DEBATE, supra note 21; see also Overview of Congressional
Publications, supra note 22, at n.11 ("After the introduction and adoption of the phonetic shorthand .
. . near verbatim reporting of congressional debate became a reality for the first time . . .").
24 SENATE REPORTERS OF DEBATE, supra note 21.
25 Act of Mar. 2, 1865, ch. 73, § 7, 13 Stat. 460 (1865).
26 See MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR SECOND
SESSION OF THE THIRTY-NINTH CONGRESS 48 (1867), https://books.google.com/books?id
rHBHAQAAIAAJ [https://perma.cc/ERN7-EDH8] (detailing the statement of disbursements).
27 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2764-68 (1866) (recording Sen. Howard, speaking
with interruptions by others).
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pages iii-cvi. The Library of Congress has retyped the index to Volume 36
to make it electronically searchable.' Unfortunately, using the index is
difficult. Searching the index for what might seem like important terms,
such as "equal protection" or "privileges or immunities," yields no results.
Instead, the search terms that produce the most relevant passages are "H.
R. No. 9," "H. R. No. 51," "H. R. No. 63," and "H. R. No. 127." These
terms refer to four joint resolutions proposing amendments to the
Constitution that, as explained below, the House and Senate seriously
considered in its first session.29 The House and Senate ultimately approved
H.R. Res. 127, and it became the Fourteenth Amendment.'
Volumes of the Congressional Globe contained appendices in which
members of Congress could have the text of speeches and other documents
printed.' The 444-page appendix to Volume 36 includes many important
comments on the proposed constitutional amendments during the spring
of 1866 which researchers definitely should not overlook. For example,
the appendix contains a speech by Representative Andre Jackson Rogers
on February 26, 1866, in which he predicted that the constitutional
amendment proposed in H.R. Res. 63 would require school
desegregation.' The Solicitor General of the United States later cited this
statement in Brown v. Board of Education as important evidence of the
original intent of Congress in approving the Fourteenth Amendment.33
Sometimes the record of the main body of Volume 36 contains explicit
references to the appendix. For instance, on June 13, 1866, the records of
the debates show that Representative Joseph H. DeFrees asked permission
"to print some remarks upon this question [of whether to approve H.R.
Res. 127], which I had not had an opportunity of delivering."'
Representative DeFrees's remarks then appear in the appendix.' In other
instances, the appendix includes speeches for which there is no reference
in the main body of Volume 36. As a result, the extent of Congress's
knowledge of what was in the appendix is not always clear. Volume 36
also includes a five-page index to the appendix. Although the Library of
Congress has retyped this index to make it electronically searchable, it is
still difficult to use. The index is organized by speaker rather than by topic,
and many of the entries are described simply as "incidental remarks"
20 LIBR. OF CONG., CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE, 1833-1873: INDEX TO 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. (last
visited Jan. 29, 2017), https://memoryloc.gov/ammem/amlawnwcglink.html [https://perma.cc/
N HX3-W6M11].
29 See infra Section 111.
30 Fourteenth Amendment and Citizenship, LIBR. OF CONG., https://www.loc.gov/law/help/
citizenship/fourteenth amendment citizenship.php (last visited Feb. 20, 2017) [https://perma.cc/
P7DB-RBUM].
31 Overview of Congressional Publications, supra note 22.
32 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at app. 134 (comments of Rep. Rogers on H.R. Res. 63).
33 See Supp. Brief for the United States on Reargument at 38-41, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954) (Nos. 1, 2, 4, 10), 1953 WL 78291, at *38-40 (quoting Joint Committee members in
support of equal protection, including with respect to education, where the majority "did not deny that
charge").
34 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 3148.
Id. at app. 226-28.
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without further elaboration on the subject. As a result, researchers need to
read the entire appendix to find what they are looking for.
The Uniforin System of Citation (the "Bluebook") recommends that
writers cite the Congressional Globe according to the Congress number
and session number but not volume number.' Accordingly, a citation of
page 3,148 of Volume 36 of the Congressional Globe would be "CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3148 (1866)." In writing about the legislative
history of the Fourteenth Amendment, using a parenthetical phrase to
indicate the date, the speaker, and the subject is also usually a helpful
practice.
B. The Journal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction
A second primary source containing important legislative history is
"The Journal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction, 39th
Congress, 1865-1867" (hereinafter "Journal of the Joint Committee").'
Researchers can find the full text of this official congressional document
reprinted in a 1914 book of the same name by Benjamin Burks Kendrick.'
The Journal of the Joint Committee documents the proceedings of the
congressional committee that drafted and introduced the proposed
constitutional amendments designated as H.R. Res. 51, 63, and 127 but not
H.R. Res. 9, which was proposed by the House Committee on the
Judiciary. The Kendrick book, which is available online for free in
searchable form, contains the text of the Journal, a helpful introduction,
and eight chapters about the history of the Joint Committee.' Members of
the Supreme Court have cited the Journal of the Joint Committee in a
number of cases interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment.'
Congress created the "Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction"
(hereinafter the "Joint Committee") on December 14, 1865.4' The Joint
Committee included nine members of the House of Representatives and
six Senators. The chair was Representative Thaddeus Stevens (R-PA) and
the other House members were John A. Bingham (R-OH), Henry Blow
(R-MO), George Boutwell (R-MA), Roscoe Conkling (R-NY), Henry
Grider (D-KY), Justin Morrill (R-VT), Andrew Jackson Rogers (D-NJ),
36 THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 130 (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al.
eds., 20th ed. 2015).
n 39TH CONG., THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION
(1865-1867), reprinted in BENJAMIN B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF
FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION 39-129 (1914).
38 Id.

n Id. at 17-36 (introduction), 138-415 (chapters I -VIM.
See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 827 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (citing the JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON
RECONSTRUCTION as evidence that the Committee's Report was widely circulated); City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 521 (1997) (relying on the same to describe objections expressed before the final
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 151 (1994)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing to the Journal to quote initial drafts of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 44 (1973) ("[T]he Journal . . . enables us to trace
the evolution of the draft language in the Committee . . . ").
41 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 57.
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and Elihu Washbume (R-IL). The Senate members were William
Fessenden (R-ME), James W. Grimes (R-IA), Ira Harris (R-NY), Jacob
Howard (R-MI), Reverdy Johnson (D-MD), and George Henry Williams
(R-OR).42 All of the members of the Committee were from states that had
not joined the Confederacy because, as discussed in depth below, the 39th
Congress refused to seat members from the former Confederate states even
thougjh President Johnson had reconstructed their governments.'
The Republicans outnumbered the Democrats on the Joint Committee
by a majority of 12-3, and they generally supported stronger measures than
the Democrats. Important differences also existed among the Republicans,
with some Republicans being moderate and others self-described as
"radical." Good examples of the difference between these Republicans can
be seen in Senator Jacob M. Howard and Representative Thaddeus
Stevens, who each led the drive for approval of H.R. Res. 127 in their
respective chambers of Congress. Senator Howard, one of the founders of
the Republican Party and a close ally of President Lincoln, was a
moderate. In reading his speeches in the Congressional Globe, it is
impossible not to observe his calm reasonableness. For instance, whenever
an opponent suggested a change to weaken the Fourteenth Amendment,
his typical, patient reply was: "I hope, sir, that this amendment will not be
adopted.' Representative Stevens was a radical. Throughout the Civil
War, he was impatient with President Lincoln's slow action on
emancipation. He was markedly more expressive when addressing those
who disagreed with proposed amendments. A typical illustration was his
comment on section 4, which prohibited payment of Confederate debts—
a provision that, he insisted, "will secure the approbation of all but
traitors."'
As described in Section III below, the Joint Committee drafted three
key proposals for constitutional amendments in the spring of 1866: H.R.
Res. 51, H.R. Res. 63, and H.R. Res. 127.46 (The House Committee on the
Judiciary drafted H.R. Res. 9, another important proposal discussed
below.47) H.R. Res. 127, which closely resembled the other proposals,
ultimately became the Fourteenth Amendment. For this reason, the Joint
Committee's records are a key part of the Amendment's legislative
history.
The Journal of the Joint Committee describes the drafts that were
before the Joint Committee, the proposed amendments to those drafts, and
the votes that the Joint Committee took on the drafts. Although the Journal
of the Joint Committee does not contain speeches or debates by its
members regarding the proposal that became the Fourteenth Amendment,
42 See KENDRICK, supra note 37, at 38-39 (listing members in the JOURNAL OF THE JOINT
COMMITTEE); see also id at 155-97 (describing the committee members).
' See infra Section 11.C.
44 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2895.
45 Id. at 3148.
46 See infra Section
42 See infra Section 111.A.
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looking at the revisions and amendments gives clues as to what the
Committee members were thinking. For example, on April 21, 1866, the
original version of the proposal that became H.R. Res. 127 had a provision
saying: "Debts incurred in aid of insurrection . . . shall not be paid by any
state nor by the United States."" The same day, Representative Rogers
moved to strike the words "by any state nor."' But the motion was
rejected, receiving a vote of three yeas and nine nays." This action shows
that the Joint Committee considered a proposal to bar only the United
States from paying former Confederate debts, but specifically rejected the
idea.
C. The Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction
A third primary source of the legislative history is the "Report of the
Joint Committee on Reconstruction" (hereinafter the "Report of the Joint
Committee").51 Members of the Supreme Court have cited this 800-page
document in several cases interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment.52 The
Report of the Joint Committee is also available for free on the Internet in
a searchable format.'
During the spring of 1866, in addition to drafting and proposing
constitutional amendments, the Joint Committee on Reconstruction also
investigated conditions in the former Confederate states. The members of
the Joint Committee called scores of witnesses to testify. The Committee's
Report sharply criticized President Johnson's efforts to reconstruct the
former Confederate states,' made recommendations for how Congress

KENDRICK, supra note 37, at 84.
1d. at 86.
" Id
51 JOINT COMM. ON RECONSTRUCTION, 39TH CONG., REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON
RECONSTRUCTION (1st Sess. 1866), https://books.google.com/books?id=dUgWAAAAYAAJ
[https://perma.cc/SYX4-FDD4] [hereinafter REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE].
" See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 772-73 nn.19, 21 (2010) (using
information in the REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE to provide the historical context behind the
Fourteenth Amendment); id. at 3071 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(stating that the Joint Committee's Report recommended the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
and noting that it "justiflied] its recommendation" by cataloguing cases where former slave states
abused civil rights); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 194 n.4 (1989) (citing the
REPORT OF THE JOINT CommrrrEE, which speaks about incidences of violence against freedmen),
superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized
in CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (2008); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 268-69
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the Joint Committee submitted
the Fourteenth Amendment to Congress "in the hope its imperfections may be cured"), superseded by
constitutional amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XXVI; Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 69,
108 09 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (citing the REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE in an analysis of
whether the Fourteenth Amendment should be interpreted as applying the Bill of Rights to the states),
overruled in part, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
53 REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 51.
" See id. at VIII IX (criticizing President Johnson's decision to reorganize and stating that "[a]s
President of the United States, he had no power, except to execute the laws of the land as Chief
Magistrate").
48
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should proceed with reconstruction," and faulted the former Confederate
states for their generally abysmal treatment of emancipated slaves.' The
Joint Committee completed this report and voted to send it to the House
and Senate on June 6, 1866.5' Members of the Committee then introduced
the Report into the House and Senate on June 8, 1866.58
The Report of the Joint Committee may be relevant to claims about
the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment for two reasons. First,
the Report explains why the Committee thought Congress should pass
H.R. Res. 127. A key passage of the Report says:
The conclusion of your committee therefore is, that the socalled Confederate States are not, at present, entitled to
representation in the Congress of the United States; that,
before allowing such representation, adequate security for
future peace and safety should be required; that this can only
be found in such changes of the organic law as shall
determine the civil rights and privileges of all citizens in all
parts of the republic, shall place representation on an
equitable basis, shall fix a stigma upon treason, and protect
the loyal people against future claims for the expenses
incurred in support of rebellion and for manumitted slaves,
together with an express grant of power in Congress to
enforce those provisions. To this end they offer a joint
resolution for amending the Constitution of the United States
59
....

Second, the Report provides background regarding the problems that
Congress perceived in 1866 and therefore presumably wished to address
with the Fourteenth Amendment. As Benjamin Kendrick put it, "the
testimony taken by the joint committee on reconstruction served as the
raison d'etre of the fourteenth amendment."'
The Report of the Joint Committee, however, did not have much direct
influence on the House and Senate as they considered H.R. Res. 127. The
Joint Committee did not complete the Report until June 6, 1866,61 and the

55 Id. at XXI (noting that the Joint Committee made specific recommendations, which are the
"result of mutual concession, after a long and careful comparison of conflicting opinions").
56 Id. at XVI—XVII (stating that the insurgent states are responsible for showing that they "accept
the results of the war" and "extend[] to all classes of citizens equal rights and privileges," and noting
that "[title feeling in many portions of the country towards emancipated slaves, especially among the
uneducated and ignorant, is one of vindictive and malicious hatred... . There is no general disposition
to place the colored race .. . upon terms even of civil equality").
n See KENDRICK, supra note 37, at 120 ("The Chairmen of the Senate and House portions of the
Joint Committee were instructed to submit the report just adopted to their respective houses.").
Ss
See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 3051 ("Mr. Stevens, from the joint committee on
reconstruction, submitted a written report .. ."); see also id. at 3038 (report introduced into the Senate
by Sen. Fessenden).
59 REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 51, at XXI.
6° KENDRICK, supra note 37, at 264.
61 Id. at 120.
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Report was not introduced into the House and Senate until June 8, 1866.62
This was too late because, as described below, the House initially
approved the original version of H.R. Res. 127 on May 10, the Senate
approved an amended version on June 8, and the House then also approved
the amended version on June 9.63 But members of Congress may have
anticipated what the Report would say even before it was formally
introduced.
On June 21, 1866, Congress passed a resolution directing the
Government Printing Office to print 100,000 copies of the Report.64
Members of Congress distributed this Report widely in the fall of 1866 in
support of their re-election campaigns.'
D. The House Journal, Senate Journal, and the Bills and Resolutions of
the 39th Congress
Three additional primary sources containing the legislative history of
the Fourteenth Amendment are the House Journal, the Senate Journal, and
the Library of Congress' collection of Congress' bills and resolutions.
Under the Constitution, the House and Senate each have a duty to keep a
"Journal of [their] Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same,
excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy."66 The
House and Senate fulfilled this duty in 1866 with official journals, the full
text of which are available in a searchable format at the Library of
Congress's website.67 Although the House and Senate Journals do not
contain floor debates, they record all of the official proceedings of the
House and Senate, such as the introduction of resolutions, the votes on
resolutions, and so forth. It is often easier to determine the progress of
resolutions, such as H.R. Res. 127, by searching the Journals instead of
trying to follow the index to the Congressional Globe.
The Library of Congress's website also contains a collection of most
(but not all) of the 39th Congress' bills and resolutions.' This collection
is useful because the Congressional Globe includes the full text of bills
and resolutions only if they were read on the House or Senate floors, and
62 CONG. GLOBE, supra note

27, at 3038, 3051.
See infra Section 111.D (describing the approval of H.R. Res. 127, the joint resolution that
became the Fourteenth Amendment).
64 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 3325-26 (adopting the resolution to "Met one hundred
thousand copies of the majority and minority reports be printed together").
65 See KENDRICK, supra 37, at 264-65 ("[T]he testimony taken by the joint committee on
reconstruction served as . . . a campaign document for the memorable election of 1866. 150,000 copies
were printed in order that senators and representatives might distribute them among their
constituents.").
66 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, el. 3.
39T0 CONG., 1sT SESS., H. JOURNAL (1866), https://memory.loc.gov/arranemi
amlaw/lwhj.html [https://perma.cc/39BL-AZMW]; 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS., S. JOURNAL (1866),
https://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/Iwsj.html [https://perma.cc/JLT3-XDTW].
68 A Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation: U.S. Congressional Documents and Debates,
1774-1873, L1BR. OF CONG., https://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwhbsb.html [https://perma.cc/
98DQ-BMEN] (last visited Feb. I, 2017).
63
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sometimes they were not. For example, the Congressional Globe records
that S. Res. 9, a proposal for amending the Constitution, was introduced
on January 5, 1866.69 As noted briefly below,' this proposed
constitutional amendment addressed the payment of Confederate debts.
The Congressional Globe, however, does not contain the text of S. Res. 9
because the proposal was not read aloud.' The Library of Congress's
website provides information about when S. Res. 9 was introduced into
Congress,72 and a link to the complete text of the resolution.73 The website
contains similar information for most of the proposed constitutional
amendments that the 39th Congress considered.
II. CONCERNS OF THE 39TH CONGRESS
A common impulse in researching the legislative history of the
Fourteenth Amendment is to open Volume 36 of the Congressional Globe
and then immediately begin looking for pertinent statements by members
of the House and Senate. But many who attempt this effort soon find that
reading the congressional debates is somewhat like watching a confusing
play with numerous actors and a complex plot. What makes the drama
especially challenging to follow is that the actors seem to have skipped the
first several acts of the play; the speakers all seem to know what has
happened in the past, but they do not necessarily share this history in their
floor statements.
Knowing something of the context in which the Amendment arose
may help. Each of the Fourteenth Amendment's five sections addresses
one or more serious concerns that Congress had in 1865 and 1866.74 These
concerns were not entirely new. Congress had attempted to address most
of them with other measures, but these other measures had proven
inadequate for one reason or another. Congress ultimately concluded that
amending the Constitution would provide a solution. At the risk of
oversimplifying complex issues, the following discussion introduces some
of the matters that concerned Congress.
A. Citizenship and Civil Rights
Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment contains two sentences. The
first sentence addresses citizenship:
See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 129 ("[Rep]. Sumner asked, and by unanimous consent
obtained, leave to introduce a joint resolution (SR. No. 9) proposing an amendment to the Constitution
of the United States for the protection of the national debt and the rejection of any rebel debt . .").
' See infra Section 111.B (discussing the 1866 proposal, S.R. No. 9, which proposed an
amendment to the Constitution to address the national debt).
71 See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 129 (noting that the proposal was "read twice by its title"
and "ordered to be printed," but was not read aloud).
n S. Res. 9, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1865) (available at https://memory.loc.gov/cgibin/query/D?hlaw:9:Itempb-ammem_osdk:: [hftps://perma.cc/3S44-LHKT]).
" Id.
" See infra Section II (discussing the concerns that Congress was contemplating when drafting
the Fourteenth Amendment).
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All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the state wherein they reside.75
The second sentence, broadly speaking, requires state governments to
respect civil rights:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.'
Before digging into floor statements about the meaning of these
provisions, researchers may benefit from the following seven important
pieces of background information about why Congress was concerned
with citizenship and civil rights.
First, shortly before the Civil War, the Supreme Court had held, in
Dred Scott v. Sandford,' that persons of African descent, whether free or
slave, could never be citizens of the United States or of any state.78
Although the Thirteenth Amendment had abolished slavery, and the Dred
Scott decision was thorouggily discredited in the North,79 the Court's
holding on the citizenship issue loomed over efforts to reconstruct the
South. For example, in an important speech on January 25, 1866,
Representative Bingham cited the Dred Scott decision and criticized the
possible exclusion of freed slaves from citizenship.' Likewise, on June 8,
1866, Senator Henderson justified section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
by criticizing the Court's reasoning in Dred Scott.' In his view, section 1
would restore the correct view of the Constitution. "It makes plain," he

" U.S. awn'. amend. XIV, § I.
76 Id.
77 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
n See id. at 407 ("In the opinion of the court, the legislation and histories of the times, and the
language used in the Declaration of Independence, show, that neither the class of persons who had
been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they had become free or not, were then [i.e.,
at the time of the Constitution's ratification] acknowledged as a part of the people, nor intended to be
included in the general words used in that memorable instrument.").
n On June 16, 1858, Abraham Lincoln denounced the Dred Scott decision in his "House
Divided" speech, declaring that the Dred Scott decision "compounded" the "machinery" that would
lead to slavery becoming lawful in all states, both Northern and Southern. Abraham Lincoln, A House
Divided, Address Before the Republican State Convention (June 6, 1858), in 2 THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 461 63 (Roy P. Basler et al. eds., 1953).
" See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 430 ("I might as well say in this connection that the
majority of the Supreme Court of the United States, even in the Dred Scott decision, were compelled
to recognize the principle for which I contend this day . . . there are none but free citizens in the
Republic .... the Constitution must be amended: I agree, if the late rebel States would make no denial
of right to the emancipated citizens no amendment would be needed. But they will make denial.").
' I See id. at 3032 ("The great error into which Chief Justice Taney falls consists in the fact that
he arbitrary excluded all negroes, though free, from this sovereignty. He unfortunately rejected the
text of the Constitution itself . . . In forming his opinion he abandoned the Constitution and the
Declaration of Independence ....").
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said, "only what was rendered doubtful."'
Second, after the Civil War, the Southern states were systematically
denying civil rights to former slaves. One of the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction's principal tasks was to gather information about
conditions in the South in order to determine the legislative measures
necessary for restoring the Union. The Committee called more than 125
witnesses who testified about the social, political, and legal conditions
prevailing in the former Confederate states." Many of these witnesses
provided information about the deplorable treatment of former slaves. For
example, Brevet Major General Edward Hatch, who had various
responsibilities in the military government, testified on January 25, 1866,
that former slaves were still being forced to work in Mississippi, that poor
whites of Alabama would never recognize blacks as part of the population,
and that former slaves were being murdered in Georgia." Other witnesses
made similar remarks.85 Based on such testimony, the Joint Committee
made addressing civil rights a top priority.
Third, the Supreme Court held before the Civil War, in Barron v.
Baltimore,' that the Bill of Rights imposes limitations only on the federal
government, and not on the states." Under the logic of this decision, the
southern state governments could deny due process of law, jury trials, and
so forth to former slaves (or anyone else) without violating the
Constitution. Members of the 39th Congress were aware of this federalism
issue and were unhappy about it. For example, on April 10, 1866,
Representative John Bingham, a prominent member of the Joint
Committee, spoke critically of Barron." Urging Congress to take action,
he said: "Is the bill of rights to stand in our Constitution hereafter, as in
the past five years within eleven States [i.e. the states making up the
Confederacy], a mere dead letter? It is absolutely essential to the safety of
the people that it should be enforced."89
Fourth, although the Emancipation Proclamation and the Thirteenth
82

Id. at 3031.
n See KENDRICK, .supra note 37, at 267-68 (stating that "a hundred and twenty-five persons"
were questioned about their living conditions and "the treatment accorded to them by the whites").
84 See REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 51, at pt. III, 4-5, 8 (statement of Brevet
Major Gen. Edward Hatch) ("I found bands of 'regulators,' many of them lately soldiers in the rebel
anny, going about the country to see that the negroes worked.... So far as any love, or regard, or care
for the negro, or the slave, I have never seen any of it. . . . [1] have known negroes to be killed [in
Georgia] without any provocation at all.").
as See, e.g., id at pt. III, 2-4 (statement of Mr. Albert Warren Kelsey) (testifying about several
instances of violence towards freedmen, include an instance where a man was "shot . dead out of
mere wantonness"); id. at pt. III, 8 (statement of Brevet Brigadier Gen. George E. Spencer) ("In the
large slaveholding counties the treatment of the negro is terrible in the extreme. In Pickens county
[Alabama] several negroes have been murdered.").
" 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
87 See id at 250-51 (holding that the Just Compensation Clause in the Fifth Amendment was
intended solely as a limit on the power of the federal government, not the power of state governments).
" See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 1089-94 (statement of Rep. John Bingham) (criticizing
the decision in Barron for failing to hold states responsible for the provisions in the Bill of Rights).
" Id. at 1090.
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Amendment had already outlawed slavery, these measures by themselves
did not guarantee equal civil rights to former slaves. President Lincoln
issued the Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863, while the Civil
War was still being fought." Using his power as Commander in Chief,
President Lincoln declared certain states and portions of states to be in
Rebellion against the government.' And "as a fit and necessary war
measure for suppressing said rebellion," President Lincoln ordered that
"all persons held as slaves within said designated states, and parts of states,
are, and henceforward shall be, free . . . ."92. President Lincoln advised the
freed slaves "to abstain from all violence, unless in necessary selfdefence," and recommended that "they labor faithfully for reasonable
wages."93 But the Proclamation did not make any further provision for the
welfare of freed slaves.
The Thirteenth Amendment was approved by the Senate on April 8,
1864, and the House on January 31, 1865.' On December 18, 1865,
Secretary of State William H. Seward announced that twenty-seven of
thirty-six states had ratified the Amendment, which was the necessary
three-quarters required for amending the Constitution.' The Thirteenth
Amendment declared that "[n] either slavery nor involuntary servitude . . .
shall exist within the United States" and gave Congress the power to
enforce this prohibition.' But ending slavery was not, by itself, sufficient
to guarantee equal rights or citizenship to former slaves.
Fifth, in March 1865, Congress passed the Freedman's Bureau Act.97
Although this statute sought to aid former slaves, it did not address civil
rights or citizenship. The Freedman's Bureau Act provided that the federal
government could lease or sell up to forty acres of confiscated and
abandoned lands "to every male citizen, whether refugee or freedman.'
This measure was important because, at least in theory, it enabled many
newly freed slaves to become independent subsistence farmers. But the
Act went no further than this on issues of equality.
Sixth, at the start of its first session, the 39th Congress unsuccessfully
attempted to expand the Freedman's Bureau Act. Senate Bill No. 60,
commonly called the Second Freedman's Bureau Bill, would have
required the President to extend military protection throughout a state
whenever the state denied any "negroes, mulattoes, freedmen . . . on
account of race [or] color" any of the "civil rights or immunities belonging

" Presidential Proclamation No. 17, 12 Stat. 1268, 1268 (Jan. 1, 1863).
91 Id
92 Id. at 1268-69.
va
Id. at 1269.
94 H. R. JOURNAL, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess. 168-71 (1865), https://memory.loc.goviatnmem/
amlaw/lwhj.htinl [https://perma.cc/5DP4-8MD5]; S. JOURNAL, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 311 13 (1864),
https://memory.loc.goviammem/amlaw/lwsj.html [https://perma.cc/7N4F-JCX11].
95
13 Stat. 774 app. 52 (1865).
96
U.S. CONST. amend. X111.
S. Res. 90, 38th Cong. (1865) (enacted).
"Id. at 508.
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to white persons" or denied the "full and equal benefit of all laws."" The
Bill also would have made it a crime, triable by a military court, to deprive
any such person of "any civil right secured to white persons . . ."" The
Senate and House passed the bill on January 25 and February 6, 1866,
respectively.'" President Johnson, however, vetoed the bill on February
19, 1866.102 In his veto message, President Johnson said, "I share with
Congress the strongest desire to secure to the freedmen the full enjoyment
of their freedom and property and their entire independence and equality
in making contracts for their labor."103 But he objected to the extension of
military jurisdiction and trials by military tribunals.' The Senate
attempted but failed to override the veto on February 20, 1866."
Seventh, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 addressed many of Congress's
concerns about citizenship and civil rights, but Congress worried about the
Act's constitutionality and permanence. The Senate first passed the bill
that became this Act on February 2, 1866,106 and the House first passed
the bill on March 13, 1866.107 President Johnson, however, vetoed the bill
on March 27, 1866.108 The Senate and House then voted to override
President Johnson's veto,109 and the Civil Rights Act became law on April
9, 1866,11° two months before Congress approved H.R. Res. 127, which
when ratified by the states became the Fourteenth Amendment."'
Addressing citizenship in words almost identical to those of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Civil Rights Act declared: "That all persons
born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding
Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States .
. . ."112 The Act then addressed certain specified civil rights by saying:
[S]uch citizens, of every race and color, without regard to
any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every
State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit,
99

CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 421.

Id. at 318.
See id. at 421 (passing the bill in the Senate); id at 688 (passing the bill in the House).
102 Veto Messages, in 6 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS
398 (1897) [hereinafter "Veto Messages"].
1' Id.
See id at 398 99 (outlining objections to the military jurisdiction and military tribunal
provisions).
105 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 943.
106 See id. at 606-07 (passing the bill in the Senate).
107 See id. at 1367 (passing the bill in the House).
'° Veto Messages, supra note 102, at 405.
th9 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 1861.
110 Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 27-29 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 198182 (1952)).
I " CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 3149.
12 Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982
(1952)).
101
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purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property, as is
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary
notwithstanding.113
President Johnson believed that making all former slaves citizens was
a rash decision. In his veto message, he asked "whether, when eleven of
the thirty-six States are unrepresented in Congress at the present time, it is
sound policy to make our entire colored population . . . citizens of the
United States."'" He objected to the non-discrimination provision on
federalism grounds, arguing that "every subject embraced in the
enumeration of rights contained in this bill has been considered as
exclusively belonging to the States."15
Despite eventual passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, many in
Congress may still have felt that the Constitution should address
citizenship and civil rights. Doubt existed about whether Congress could
overrule the Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott by statute,116 and
President Johnson's veto had raised questions about the constitutionality
of the Civil Rights Act.' In addition, the 39th Congress may have worried
that a later Congress, with representatives from the former Confederate
states, would overturn this provision. For these reasons, Congress may
have felt the need to place a provision like section one of the Fourteenth
Amendment in the Constitution.
B. Representation in Congress
Congress was also concerned about representation of the former
Confederate states in the House of Representatives. The first sentence of
section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment says: "Representatives shall be
apportioned among the several states according to their respective
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, excluding
Indians not taxed."18
This sentence repeats the general rule of Article I, section 2, clause 3
of the Constitution on the apportionment of representatives, but it
eliminates the former "Three-Fifths Compromise" under which slaves
counted as three-fifths of a person for the purpose of determining the
1

" Id.

Veto Messages, supra note 102, at 406.
1 5 Id. at 407.
116 See Rebecca E. Zietlow, Congressional Enforcement of the Rights of Citizenship, 56 DRAKE
L. REV. 1015, 1027 (2008) ("Uncertainty over Congress's authority to legislatively overrule the Dred
Scott decision prompted Congress to create birthright citizenship in the Fourteenth Amendment's
114

Citizenship Clause.").
17 See Veto Messages, supra note 102, at 398 ("[T]he bill before me contains provisions which
in my opinion are not warranted by the Constitution .. ..").
18 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 2.
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number of representatives of a state.' This change reflected the
obsolescence of the Three-Fifths Compromise after the Thirteenth
Amendment ended slavery.
The second sentence of section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment is
more complicated. It provides that states will lose some of their
representation if they do not allow all "male inhabitants . . . twenty-one
years of age" to vote.' The second sentence says in full:
But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of
electors for President and Vice President of the United
States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and
judicial officers of a state, or the members of the legislature
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state,
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such state."
A brief review of history is necessary to understand what Congress
was concerned about in approving this provision. The Civil War
essentially ended when Confederate General Robert E. Lee surrendered to
Union General Ulysses S. Grant on April 9, 1865.122 Just six days later, on
April 15, 1865, John Wilkes Booth assassinated President Abraham
Lincoln.123 Vice President Andrew Johnson then became President.'
Johnson immediately had to decide what to do about the eleven former
Confederate states." Loyalists in four of these states—Arkansas,
Louisiana, Tennessee, and Virginia—had already formed new
governments, and President Johnson recognized them as legitimate.' The
other seven state governments—in Alabama, Florida, Georgia,
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas—had either
collapsed entirely or were not recognized as legitimate.127
During the summer of 1865, President Johnson issued Presidential
Proclamations directing the occupying Union military authorities to hold
conventions in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina,
South Carolina, and Texas for the purpose of amending the state
119 Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 ("Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several
states which may be included within this union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be
determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term
of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.").
120 Id. amend. XIV, § 2.
121 Id.
122 See STEPHANIE FITZGERALD, A CIVIL WAR TIMELINE 42 (2014).
123 See id. at 43.
124 See id.
125 See REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 51, at vii.
129 See KENDRICK, supra note 37, at 17.
127 See id.
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constitutions and forming a new government!' He cited the Guarantee
Clause in Article IV of the Constitution as authority for this action!' By
December 1865, all of the states that previously had joined the
Confederacy, except Texas, had established new governments!"
These reconstructed states desired to send representatives to Congress
but northern politicians objected for two reasons. First, President
Johnson's reconstruction efforts were flawed in an important way. His
proclamations limited participation in the state constitutional conventions
to those who were eligible to vote before the rebellion, and this restriction
automatically excluded former slaves.' Meanwhile, President Johnson's
proclamations allowed all but a small category of high level former
confederates and confederate supporters to vote so long as they took an
oath of loyalty. t32 The result was that the newly reconstructed states were
mostly formed and led by former Confederates.133 The proper solution
would have been to allow former slaves to vote. But this alternative would
have been very controversial-and even hypocritical-because at the time
only six northern states allowed non-whites to vote!'
Second, Congress was worried about the number of representatives
that the Southern States would send to the House of Representatives.
Because slavery no longer existed, the Three-Fifths compromise would no
longer limit the population of any state for determining representation in
128 See Proclamation No. 38, 13 Stat. 760 (May 29, 1865) (reorganizing North Carolina);
Proclamation No. 39, 13 Stat. 761 (June 13, 1865) (reorganizing Mississippi); Proclamation No. 41,
13 Stat. 764 (June 17, 1865) (reorganizing Georgia); Proclamation No. 42,13 Stat. 765 (June 17, 1865)
(reorganizing Texas); Proclamation No. 43, 13 Stat. 767 (June 21, 1865) (reorganizing Alabama);
Proclamation No. 46, 13 Stat. 769 (June 30, 1865) (reorganizing South Carolina); Proclamation No.
47, 13 Stat. 771 (July 13, 1865) (reorganizing Florida).
129 See, e.g., Proclamation No. 38, 13 Stat. 760 (May 29, 1865) ("Whereas the fourth section of
the fourth article of the Constitution of the United States declares that the United States shall guarantee
to every State in the Union a representative form of government . ."); see also U.S. CONST. art. IV,
4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government,
and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the
Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.").
130 See KENDRICK, supra note 37, at 17. President Johnson did not recognize Texas as having
properly created a new state government until August 1866. Proclamation No. 4, 14 Stat. 814, 817
(Aug. 20, 1866).
131 See, e.g., Proclamation No. 39, 13 Stat. 761, 762 (June 13, 1865) NNE, person shall be
qualified as an elector, or shall be eligible as a member of such convention, unless he shall have
previously taken and subscribed the oath of amnesty, as set forth in the President's Proclamation of
May 29, A. D. 1865, and is a voter qualified as prescribed by the constitution and laws of the State of
Mississippi in force immediately before the ninth (9th) of January, A. D. 1861, the date of the socalled ordinance of secession ... .").
132 See, e.g., id. (requiring electors to take a loyalty oath); Proclamation No. 37, 13 Stat. 758,
75& 59 (May 29, 1865) (excluding fourteen categories of former Confederates from taking the loyalty
oath, including civil or diplomatic agents of the Confederate government, Confederate military
officers above the rank of colonel, Confederate governors, and so forth).
133
See REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 51, at x.
134
See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 156--57 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (noting that, at the time, former slaves could only vote in Maine, New Hampshire,
Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New York, and that referenda that would have
enfranchised former slaves had been defeated in Connecticut, Wisconsin, the Territory of Colorado,
and the District of Columbia), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XXVI.
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Congress. Accordingly, the Southern states would receive more
representation in Congress because all of the former slaves would count
as one person rather than three-fifths of a person. One estimate was that
the South would have at least fifteen more members.' In a statement on
January 24, 1866, Representative Burton C. Cook explained why this
result was ironic and undesirable!' He noted that, under the Three-Fifths
Compromise, "the white people in certain States were [already] granted an
unequal and disproportionate number of Representatives upon this floor
because they were the owners of slaves, so that in those States each voter
had a greater power and influence in the Government than any voter in any
free State."' Elimination of the Three-Fifths Compromise without giving
former slaves the right to vote would make the situation worse: "But by
the fact that slavery is dead this inequality of representation is increased; .
. . the number would be increased two fifths, the three fifths of a person
has become a whole person."' Representative Burton concluded with this
characterization of the practical result of the elimination of the ThreeFifths Compromise: "The reward of treason will be an increased
representation in this House, an increased influence in the Government to
the traitors who have sworn and striven to destroy It."139
The issue of representation came to a head when the 39th Congress
convened for its first session from December 4, 1865, to July 28, 1866.140
Some of the newly reconstructed states attempted to send Senators and
Representatives to Washington, but Congress refused to allow them to
participate. Their exclusion took place in a dramatic manner On the
opening day of the first session, when the clerks of the House and Senate
took roll, members from these Southern states were present but the clerks
simply did not call their names."' For example, Horace Maynard, who had
always been loyal to the United States and who had been elected as a
member of the House of Representatives from Tennessee,'" was present
but his name was not called!' He attempted to object but he was not
allowed to speak.' Representative James Brooks of New York then
135 See id. at 157 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("While predictions of the precise effect of the change
varied with the person doing the calculating, the consensus was that the South would be entitled to at
least 15 new members of Congress, and, of course, a like number of new presidential electors.").
136 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 410 (statement of Rep. Burton C. Cook).
137 Id.

"5 Id.
139 Id. For a table showing the projected increases state by state, see id. at app. 118.
1411 The 39th Congress, which had been elected in the fall of 1864, convened for a special oneweek session from March 4 through March 11, 1865. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Special
Sess.I424 (indicating that Congress convened for a special session). However, the "first session" of
this Congress did not begin until December 4, 1865. See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 1 (indicating
that Congress convened its first session).
141 See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at I (showing the roll call of Senators, which did not include
any from former Confederate states); id. at 3 (showing the same for the roll call of House Members).
142 See ERIC L. MCKJTRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION 258 (1988).
143 See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 3 (failing to call Rep. Maynard at roll call, and then
denying him the opportunity to speak).
'4 See id (interrupting Rep. Maynard as he attempted to speak)

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

2017]

1091

objected, arguing that it was "revolutionary" to exclude representatives in
this manner.'" But his protestations fell on deaf ears.'"
The final result was that the 39th Congress met, and ultimately
approved the Fourteenth Amendment, without including any Senators or
Representatives from the former Confederate States.147 Their presence
surely would have affected the entire process. If at times Congress appears
to have acted in haste during the spring of 1866, a likely explanation is
that the Northern Senators and Representatives recognized that they had
only a limited window of opportunity to approve provisions that Southern
delegations might block when they reentered Congress.
C. Eligibility of Former Confederates to Hold Office
Congress was also concerned about the participation of former rebels
in politics. For this reason, section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment
concerns the eligibility of former Confederates to hold federal or state
government offices.'" The section disqualifies anyone who both
previously (1) took an oath to support the Constitution as a significant
federal or state government official, and (2) then engaged in rebellion.'49
The first sentence says:
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress,
or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office,
civil or military, under the United States, or under any state,
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of
Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a
member of any state legislature, or as an executive or judicial
officer of any state, to support the Constitution of the United
States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion
against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof.'5°
Congress, however, recognized the possible need for exceptions.
Accordingly, the second sentence of section 3 says: "But Congress may
by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability."'
This provision requires a little background to understand. Having just
won the Civil War and defeated the Confederacy, Congress was concerned
that former leaders of the Confederacy would take over the state and
federal offices. Congress rejected the approach, favored by President
Johnson in his proclamations, of excluding only high level Confederate

Id.
See id. (failing to respond to Rep. Brooks' objection).
See id. at 3149 (voting to pass the Fourteenth Amendment in both houses of Congress).
I" U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3.
149 Id.
145

"" Id.
151 Id.
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officials.152 Instead, it focused on those who had sworn to uphold the
Constitution and then violated that oath."
D. Confederate Debts
In addition to the foregoing issues, Congress was also concerned about
payment of Union and Confederate debts. The first sentence of section 4
of the Fourteenth Amendment provides assurance that the federal
government will honor its own obligations, saying:
The validity of the public debt of the United States,
authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of
pensions and bounties for services in suppressing
insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned.'
The second sentence, however, prohibits both the federal government and
the state governments from paying Confederate debts or paying for
emancipated slaves:
But neither the United States nor any state shall assume or
pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or
rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss
or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations
and claims shall be held illegal and void.'
These two provisions arose because of the great cost of the Civil War
to both sides of the conflict. The North and South each borrowed huge
sums, at home and abroad, to finance their military operations. The public
debt of the United States in 1860 was $64.8 million; at the end of 1865, it
was $2.2 billion.' Jefferson Davis estimated that the Confederate debt in
late 1864 was more than $1.1 billion.' Senator Howard, however,
thought that the amount was much larger and that any attempt to pay it
would invite all manner of claimants to emerge.1" He said:
The amount of that debt is probably not less than five billion
dollars. We do not know its exact amount, and I am not sure
that it is possible ever to ascertain it; but if there should ever
be a fair prospect of its assumption by the United States or
by the States it is perfectly certain that the evidences of it
152 See Proclamation No. 37, 13 Stat. 758, 758-59 (May 29, 1865) (excluding only fourteen
categories of former Confederates from taking the loyalty oath, including civil or diplomatic agents of
the Confederate government, Confederate military officers above the rank of colonel, Confederate
governors, and so forth).
153 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3 (rendering ineligible for public service any person who
violated a prior oath of office by participating in the rebellion).
' 54 Id. § 4.
155 Id.
156 Historical
Debt
Outstanding,
The
19th
Century,
ThEA
' SURYDIRECT,
https://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/histdebt/histdebt_19cent.htm [https://perma.cc/KE44
-F2Q2] (last visited Jan. 25, 2017).
157 JEFFERSON DAVIS, 1 THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 493 (1881).
158 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2768 (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard).
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would multiply . .15°
Congress believed that the federal government should not disavow the
Union debt because the debt was legitimate, and defaulting on the debt
might make future borrowing difficult and more expensive. But Congress
felt that neither the federal government nor any of the former Confederate
states should repay the Confederate debts; these debts were huge and
illegitimate, the former Confederate states were penniless, and repudiating
the debts should dissuade anyone from making loans to future rebels.
Section 4 embodies these principles. Representative Thaddeus Stevens
thought that the provision was so obviously just that it did not even require
discussion.'6°
The position of many southerners was different. Many southerners
held Confederate notes that had been issued as currency. Others had
bought confederate bonds. Still others had performed contracts or worked
for the Confederate government and had not received payment. Southern
creditors felt that it was unfair to deny them payment and then to force
them to rejoin the Union and be responsible—along with everyone else—
for paying the Union debts. This thinking may seem unrealistic for the
losers of a war to hold, but it is often the case that a defeated enemy does
not pay the victor's costs.'
The Joint Committee heard numerous witnesses testify that the feeling
in the South was that the federal government should either assume both
the Union and Confederate debts or repudiate both of them. For example,
Senator Howard asked John Hawkshurst, a union loyalist from Virginia,
what Virginians thought about the state's debt:
Question. Suppose they cannot repudiate it; what then would
they do; would they then ask to have their own debt assumed
by the United States government?
Answer. Yes; I think there is a strong feeling that their own
obligations should be paid as well as ours; I think, however,
there is a strong feeling in favor of repudiation of the whole;
but failing in that, would endeavor to throw in their own.' 62
Others made similar comments. One witness explained that a prevailing
view was "if they [are] going now to [re]establish the Union they should
repudiate both debts or pay both debts."163 Congress, however, ultimately
decided that the Union debts should be paid and the Confederate debts
`" Id.
See id. at 3148 (allocating only one short sentence to section 4 before moving on).
161 For example, the United States decided not to insist on financial reparations from Japan after
World War II based on "strategic considerations in the context of the Cold War and the growing
concern of the United States to prevent a course of action which would have required it to in effect
finance Japanese reparation payments to third states." Rudolf Dolzer, The Settlement of War-Related
Claims: Does International Law Recognize a Victim's Private Right of Action? Lessons After 1945,
20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 296, 312 (2002).
162 REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 51, pt. II, at 21.
163
1d. at 62.
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should not be paid.
Another question before Congress was whether the federal
government would pay compensation to the former owners of
emancipated slaves. As discussed below, several proposed constitutional
amendments concerned this question.' In the end, Congress addressed
this point in section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
E. Congress 's Limited Powers
Finally, Congress was concerned about its legislative power. Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "The Congress shall have power
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."' As
noted above, President Johnson vetoed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 on
grounds that Congress lacked the power to enact the provision. In his veto
message, President Johnson explained: "[A]s to the States no . . . provision
exists vesting in Congress the power 'to make rules and regulations' for
them.' Although Congress overrode President Johnson's veto, Congress
knew that without an express grant of power, a constitutional objection
might arise to any future civil rights legislation that it wanted to enact.
Under the Tenth Amendment and the structure of the Constitution,
Congress is a legislature of limited powers.167 Nothing in the Constitution
expressly gives Congress the power to enforce either the Bill of Rights or
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article N. Accordingly, Senator
Howard said section 5 was "indispensable" because "[w]ithout this clause,
no power is granted to Congress by the amendment or any one of its
sections" to protect civil rights.' Representative Bingham said that "it
has been the want of the Republic that there was not an express grant of
power in the Constitution to enable the whole people of every State, by
congressional enactment, to enforce obedience to these requirements of
the Constitution."' In addition, Congress had already added a similar
clause to the Thirteenth Amendment granting power to enforce the
prohibition on slavery.' That precedent made adding section 5 to the
Fourteenth Amendment a logical step.
III. PROPOSED JOINT RESOLUTIONS FOR AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION
In the first session of the 39th Congress, members of the House and
Senate introduced numerous proposals for constitutional amendments.
164
Infra Section IRA.
165 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
166 Veto Messages, supra note 102, at 3606.
167 U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."); Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) ("The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited

1"

CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2768.

169

Id. at 1034.

'7° See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 ("Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.").
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Congress designated each proposal as a House or Senate joint resolution,
and assigned it a number. For example, as described below, one proposal
for amending the Constitution to prohibit payment of Confederate debts
was House Joint Resolution No. 9171 (abbreviated as "H. R. No. 9" in the
Congressional Globe,' and as "H. Res. 9" in the House Journal173).
Ordinarily, joint resolutions require the approval of a majority of the
House and Senate and the signature of the President.' But by their
express terms, H.R. Res. 9 and the other joint resolutions proposing
constitutional amendments required the concurrence of two-thirds of both
the House and Senate and approval by three-quarters of the state
legislatures (but not the signature of the President)." These approval
requirements satisfy the standards in Article V for amending the
Constitution.'
Some of the proposals for constitutional amendments during the first
session of the 39th Congress addressed Congress's concerns about
citizenship, civil rights, representation of former Confederate States in
Congress, the eligibility of former Confederate leaders to hold office,
payment of Union and Confederate debts, and the powers of Congress. As
described below, the most important of these joint resolutions were H.R.
Res. 9, H.R. Res. 51, H.R. Res. 63, and H.R. Res. 127. Of these measures,
only H.R. Res. 127 achieved the support of two-thirds of the House and
the Senate; it ultimately became the Fourteenth Amendment. The other
joint resolutions, however, are important because they may provide clues
about the meaning that Congress attached to H.R. Res. 127.
A. H.R. Res. 9 (Confederate Debts)
As described above, a major concern of Congress in 1866 was the
extensive debts incurred by the Confederate State governments. Congress
thought that it had no duty to repay these debts and did not want the newly
reformed governments of the former Confederate states to pay them either.
Congress ultimately addressed this issue by approving H.R. Res. 127,
which included what is now section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
But H.R. Res. 127 was not the first proposal that Congress considered for
amending the Constitution to address Confederate debts. On the contrary,
' 7' See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 84 (proposing House Joint Resolution No. 9 as an
amendment to the Constitution).
172 See, e.g., id. at 88 (abbreviating House Joint Resolution No. 9 as "H. R. No. 9").
173 See, e.g., H. JOURNAL, supra note 67, at 92 (abbreviating House Joint Resolution No. 9 as "H.
Res. 9").
74 Joint Resolution, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.govireference/glossary term/joint resol
ution.htm [https://perma.ce/BT3J-BTL3] (last visited Mar. 28, 2017).
17' H.R. Res. 9, for example, started by saying: "Be it resolved by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States in Congress assembled, (two thirds of both Houses concurring,)
That the following article be proposed . . as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
which, when ratified by three fourths of [state] Legislatures, shall be valid to all intents and purposes
as part of said Constitution, namely ...." CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 84.
Thus. CONST. art. V.
177 Id amend. XIV, § 4.
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on December 6, 1865, Representative Farnsworth introduced a joint
resolution, H.R. Res. 9, a proposal on the subject which the House referred
to its Committee on the Judiciary.' The Committee studied the matter,
and reported back with a slight revision on December 19, 1865.179 As
revised, H.R. Res. 9 proposed an amendment to the Constitution that
would read as follows:
No tax, duty, or impost shall be laid, nor shall any
appropriation of money be made, by either the United States,
or any one of the States thereof, for the purpose of paying,
either in whole or in part, any debt, contract, or liability
whatsoever, incurred, made, or suffered by any one or more
of the States, or the people thereof, for the purpose of aiding
rebellion against the Constitution and laws of the United
States.'"
Representative Wilson explained that this proposed Amendment had
just one purpose, which was that "no part of the people, either in the North
or the South, shall be called upon in the future to pay one dollar of the debt
. . . contracted for the purpose of destroying the Government of the United
States."' The House debated the proposal the same day and then easily
approved it, without changes, by well more than the required two-thirds
margin (150 yeas, 11 nays, and 21 not voting).182 The Senate learned of
the House's approval of the proposed joint resolution on December 20,
1865.183 Despite the extraordinarily speedy passage of the measure in the
House, the Senate never debated H.R. Res. 9, and it was removed from the
Senate's calendar on June 20, 1866.184
In addition to H.R. Res. 9, members of the House and Senate proposed
but did not approve several other joint resolutions proposed as
constitutional amendments addressing the payment of Confederate debts
and paying for the emancipation of slaves: S. Res. 9,185 S. Res. 10,186 S.
Res. 24,187 S. Res. 62,188 S. Res. 76,189 and H.R. Res. 43.1' Members of
the House and Senate said little about these measures and they did not
See H. JOURNAL, supra note 67, at 36.
See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 84. On December 13, 1865, Senator Stewart had
introduced a similar proposal for a constitutional amendment into the Senate as S. Res. 5. Id at 35.
The Senate took no action on this proposal. Id. at 3276--77.
80
Id at 84.
181 Id at 86 (statement of Rep. James F. Wilson).
1" Id at 84-87.
87 Id. at 88.
1" Id at 3276-77.
in S. Res. 9 was introduced on January 5, 1866. Id at 129. The Senate postponed consideration
of S. Res. 9 indefinitely on June 20, 1866. Id. at 3276.
186 Id. at 129, 3276.
187 Id at 391, 701 -02.
Id at 1906.
1" Id. at 2233.
90 Id at 1605. H.R. Res. 43 was introduced on March 13, 1866, and referred to the Joint
Committee. Id at 1367. An attempt to bring it up for discussion on March 27, 1866 failed. Id. at 1695.
178

179
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come to a vote. Although none of these proposed measures became part of
the Constitution, contrasting them to H.R. Res. 127 may provide clues as
to the meaning of section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment.19 '
B. H.R. Res. 51 (Representation in Congress)
Another issue that concerned Congress, as described above, was the
representation of the former Confederate states in Congress. Congress
ultimately addressed this issue in section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment
as set forth in H.R. Res. 127. But H.R. Res. 127 was not the first joint
resolution proposing a constitutional amendment to tackle the subject.
On December 5, 1865, Representative Thaddeus Stevens introduced a
joint resolution to the Constitution that would make a state's
representation depend on the number of eligible voters in the state.' The
House immediately referred this unnumbered proposal to the Committee
on the Judiciary.193 On January 8, 1866, the House met as a committee of
the whole and informally discussed the problem of representation.'"
During this session, Representative Blaine of Maine proposed an
amendment to Article 1, section 2, clause 3, which excludes from a state's
population "those to whom civil or political rights or privileges are denied
or abridged by the constitution or laws of any State on account of race or
color."195 He predicted that the amendment would "secure the right of
suffrage to the colored population throughout the South in a very few
years."196 Otherwise, the states would lose representation; they could not
even count African-Americans as three-fifths of a person for determining
their populations. The House, later that day, referred this proposal to the
Joint Committee.' The House again discussed the issue of the basis of
representation on January 22-26, and 29-30.198
On January 9 and 12, the Joint Committee considered possible ways
to address the issue of representation, and settled on proposing the
following text:
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States which may be included within this Union according
to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of
persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed: Provided,
That whenever the elective franchise shall be denied or
abridged in any State on account of race or color, all persons
191 See infra Section IV for a discussion about how courts and scholars have attempted to discern
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, in part by contrasting H.R. Res. 127 with earlier joint
resolutions that failed to obtain sufficient support.
192 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 10.
'93 Id.
194
1d. at 138-42.
' 95 /d. at 141 42.
196 Id
197 Id. at 136.
198 See id. at 353-59 (Jan. 22); id. at 376-89 (Jan. 23); id. at 403-12 (Jan. 24); id. at 422-35 (Jan.
25); id. at 447-60 (Jan. 26); id. at 483 94 (Jan. 29); id. at 508-09 (Jan. 30).
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therein of such race or color shall be excluded from the basis
of representation.' 99
Representative Thaddeus Stevens introduced this proposal into the
House on January 31 as H.R. Res. 51,200 and made the purpose of the
proposed amendment abundantly clear:
If a state abuses the elective franchise and takes it from those
who are the only loyal people there, the Constitution says to
such a State, you shall lose power in the halls of the nation,
and you shall remain where you are, a shriveled and driedup nonentity . . . .201
The same day, after brief debates, the House voted to approve the
amendment by a two-thirds margin (120 yeas, 46 nays, and 16 not
voting).202 H.R. Res. 51 then went to the Senate for approval. The Senate
discussed the proposal on. February 6-9, 14, 16, 21, 23 and March 5, 7-9,
1866.203 When the Senate voted on March 9, 1866, a majority of the
Senators approved it but not with the required two-thirds majority (the vote
was 25 in favor and 22 against)." Accordingly, H.R. Res. 51 did not have
enough support to become a constitutional amendment.' At least two
other joint resolutions also addressed representation in Congress, but they
were not discussed.'
C. H.R. Res. 63 (Civil Rights and the Powers of Congress)
As described above,202 Congress had two important concerns about
civil rights in 1866. One was that the Bill of Rights by itself did not limit
the actions of state governments and the other was the Congress lacked
any express power to enforce the Bill of Rights against the states. Congress
ultimately addressed these concerns in sections 1 and 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' But before Congress approved H.R. Res. 127, the House
1" Id at 535.
at 534-535. Senator Fessenden introduced a similar measure into the Senate on January
22, 1866, as S. Res. 22. See id. at 337 ("That whenever the elective franchise shall be denied or
abridged in any State on account of race or color all persons of such race or color shall be excluded
from the basis of representation.").
201 Id. at 536.
2" Id. at 535-38.
2" See id. at 673-87 (discussing H.R. Res. 51 on February 6); id at 702-08 (discussing H.R.
Res. 51 on February 7); id. at 736-42 (discussing H.R. Res. 51 on February 8); id. at 763-70
(discussing H.R. Res. 51 on February 9); id. at 831-35 (discussing H.R. Res. 51 on February 14); id
at 876-86 (discussing H.R. Res. 51 on February 16); id. at 957-65 (discussing H.R. Res. 51 on
February 21); id. at 981-91 (discussing H.R. Res. 51 on February 23); id. at 1180-84 (discussing H.R.
Res. 51 on March 5); id. at 1224-33 (discussing H.R. Res. 51 on March 7); id. at 1254-58 (discussing
H.R. Res. 51 on March 8); id. at 1275-89 (discussing H.R. Res. 51 on March 9).
204 Id. at 1288-89.
2'Id.
Id. at 2264-65 (addressing S. Res. 78 on April 30,1866); id. at 2560 (addressing S. Res. 78
on May 14, 1866).
2" See supra Section 11.B (detailing representation in Congress).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1,5.
zno Id.
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considered another provision, H.R. Res. 63, which had similar objectives.
H.R. Res. 63 arose in the Joint Committee. On January 12, the Joint
Committee formed a subcommittee on the powers of Congress.209 On
January 27, 1866, Representative Bingham reported to the full committee
that the subcommittee had approved a proposed amendment.21° The
subcommittee's proposal said:
Congress shall have power to make laws which shall be
necessary and proper to secure to all persons in every state
full protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property;
and to all citizens of the United States in any State the same
immunities and equal political rights and privileges.2"
Although the Journal of the Joint Committee does not report the debates
of the full committee, it does show that the full committee made minor
amendments to the proposal on both January 27 and February 3.212 On
February 10, the Committee then voted to send the proposed amendment
to both Houses of Congress as a proposed constitutional amendment.213
On February 26, Representative Bingham introduced the proposed
constitutional amendment to the House as a joint resolution, H.R. Res.
6-.
.5 214 The proposal, as it had been revised by the full committee, said:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall
be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each
State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
States (Art. 4, Sec. 2), and to all persons in the several States
equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property
(5th Amendment).21 5
After quoting the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Article V and
the last clause of the Fifth Amendment, Representative Bingham said:
Sir, it has been the want of the Republic that there was not
an express grant of power in the Constitution to enable the
whole people of every State, by congressional enactment, to
enforce obedience to these requirements of the Constitution.
Nothing can be plainer to thoughtful men than that if the
grant of power had been originally conferred upon the
Congress of the nation, and legislation had been upon your
statute-books to enforce these requirements of the
Constitution in every State, that rebellion, which has scarred
"9 KENDRICK,

supra note 37, at 43,46.

' Id. at 56.

21

211 Id.
212 See id. at 56-58 (describing the amendments agreed to o n January 27); id. at 60-61
(describing the amendments agreed to on February 3).
213 Id. at 62-63.
214 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 1033-34. Senator Fessenden had introduced a very similar
measure, S.R. 30, on February 13,1866. Id. at 806.
215
Id. at 1034.
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and blasted the land, would have been an impossibility.216
Representative Bingham explained that the proposed amendment would
solve these problems. He said: "The proposition pending before the House
is simply a proposition to arm the Congress of the United States, by the
consent of the people of the United States, with the power to enforce the
bill of rights as it stands in the Constitution today."'
The House of Representatives debated H.R. Res. 63 on February 2628.218 Despite Representative Bingham's arguments, opponents of the
proposal strongly objected that it went too far. The Supreme Court
summarized the opposition to H.R. Res. 63 in City of Boerne v. Flores:219
[Some argued that the] proposed Amendment gave Congress
too much legislative power at the expense of the existing
constitutional structure. Democrats and conservative
Republicans argued that the proposed Amendment would
give Congress a power to intrude into traditional areas of
state responsibility, a power inconsistent with the federal
design central to the Constitution. Typifying these views,
Republican Representative Robert Hale of New York
labeled the Amendment "an utter departure from every
principle ever dreamed of by the men who framed our
Constitution," and warned that under it "all State legislation,
in its codes of civil and criminal jurisprudence and
procedure . . . may be overridden, may be repealed or
abolished, and the law of Congress established instead."
Senator William Stewart of Nevada likewise stated the
Amendment would permit "Congress to legislate fully upon
all subjects affecting life, liberty, and property," such that
"there would not be much left for the State Legislatures,"
and would thereby "work an entire change in our form of
government." Some radicals, like their brethren "unwilling
that Congress shall have any such power . . . to establish
uniform laws throughout the United States upon . . . the
protection of life, liberty, and property," also objected that
giving Congress primary responsibility for enforcing legal
equality would place power in the hands of changing
congressional majorities.'
On February 28, 1866, when it appeared that the proposal would not
gain approval, the House voted to postpone consideration until "the second

Id
Id. at 1088.
215 See id. at 1033-34 (discussing H.R. Res. 63 on February 26); id. at 1054--67 (discussing H.R.
Res. 63 on February 27); id. at 1083-95 (discussing H.R. Res. 63 on February 28).
uv 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
220 Id. at 520-21 (citations omitted).
216
217
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Tuesday in April" (i.e., April 10, 1866).221 The House, however, never
reopened the subject. On June 6, 1866, Representative Bingham moved
that H.R. Res. 63 "be indefinitely postponed, for reason that the
constitutional amendment already passed by the House [i.e., H.R. Res.
127] covers the whole subject matter."222 The House approved the
motion.' The Senate never considered H.R. Res. 63.
D. H.R. Res. 127 (The Fourteenth Amendment)
After these unsuccessful initial attempts to approve the previously
discussed joint resolutions proposing amendments to the Constitution,
Congress finally succeeded with H.R. Res. 127, the provision that became
the Fourteenth Amendment. H.R. Res. 127 was broader in scope than the
prior proposals. It addressed all of the subjects of H.R. Res. 9, H.R. Res.
51, and H.R. Res. 63. It also included a provision on the eligibility of
former Confederate officials to hold government office.
On April 21, 1866, Representative Stevens introduced into the Joint
Committee "a plan of reconstruction, one not of his own framing, but [one]
which he should support."224 This proposal contained five sections. The
Committee debated the proposal and, as described below, made various
revisions before approving it for submission to Congress on April 28,
1866.225 Representative Stevens introduced the proposal into the House on
April 30, 1866, as H.R. Res. 127,226 but the House voted to postpone
discussing the proposal until May 8.227 On May 8, Representative Stevens
gave a long speech in which he explained the meaning and purpose of each
section.228 The House debated H.R. Res. 127 on May 8, 9, and 10.229 On
May 10, the House voted to approve H.R. Res. 127, without amendment,
by a two-thirds majority (128 yeas, 37 nays, and 19 not voting).230
H.R. Res. 127 was introduced into the Senate on May 10, but no
discussion occurred on that day." On May 23, Senator Howard initiated
the Senate's consideration of H.R. Res. 127 by analyzing each of its five
sections.232 The Senate discussed H.R. Res. 127 as a committee of the
whole on May 23, 24, and 29, in regular sessions on May 30 and 31, and
221 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 1094-95. Immediately before this decision, the House
rejected a motion to "lay the whole subject on the table," which would have only temporarily delayed
consideration. Id.
222 Id. at 2980.
223 Id.
224 KENDRICK, supra note 37, at 82-83.
225 See id at 83-116 (documenting revisions to the initial plan).
226 LONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2286.
227 Id.

See id. at 2459-60 (providing a transcript of the speech made by Representative Stevens).
See id. at 2458-73 (discussing H.R. Res. 127 on May 8); id. at 2498---513 (discussing H.R.
Res. 127 on May 9); id. at 2530-45 (discussing H.R. Res. 127 on May 10).
230 Id. at 2545.
231 Id. at 2530.
232 See id. at 2764-68 (May 23, 1866) (detailing Senator Howard's explanation of sections I - 5
of H.R. Res. 127).
228
229
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as a committee of the whole from June 4 to June 8.2" During this time, as
discussed below, the Senate made various amendments to the proposal.
On June 8, 1866, the Senate approved the amended version of H.R. Res.
127 by a two-thirds vote (33 yeas, 11 nays).234
Because the Senate had approved an amended version of H.R. Res.
127, the joint resolution had to go back to the House to see if the House
would concur in the Senate's amendments. The Amended version of H.R.
Res. 127 was introduced in the House on June 9.235 The House debated the
amended version on June 13.236 Representative Stevens briefly described
the Senate's amendments, some of which he approved and some of which
he disfavored.' The House concurred in the Senate's version by a twothirds vote (120 yeas, 32 nays, and 32 not voting).238
Congress sent the approved version of joint resolution H.R. Res. 127
to the Secretary of State, for delivery to President Johnson, on June 16.239
President Andrew Johnson likely opposed the Fourteenth Amendment, but
Article V assigns no role to the President in the Amendment process.
Accordingly, President Andrew Johnson's only duty was to send the
proposed Fourteenth Amendment to the states, which he did on June 22,
1866.240 In doing so, he emphasized that this action should "be considered
as purely ministerial, and in no sense whatever committing the Executive
to an approval or a recommendation of the amendment to the State
legislatures or to the people.,/241
The details of the state ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment are
beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say that there were serious
irregularities.' But on July 28, 1868, Secretary of State William Seward
proclaimed that three-fourths of the states had ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment.243
The following discussion outlines the development of the text of each
section of H.R. Res. 127 from the initial proposal of April 21 within the
Joint Committee to the final version approved by the House and Senate.

233 See id at 2764-71 (discussing H.R. Res. 127 on May 23); id. at 2798-2804 (discussing H.R.
Res. 127 on May 24); id. at 2868-69 (discussing H.R. Res. 127 on May 29); id. at 2890-02 (discussing
H.R. Res. 127 on May 30); id. at 2914-21 (discussing H.R. Res. 127 on May 31); id at 2938-44
(discussing H.R. Res. 127 on June 4); id. at 2960-65 (discussing H.R. Res. 127 on June 5); id. at 298493 (discussing H.R. Res. 127 on June 6), id. at 3010-11 (discussing H.R. Res. 127 on June 7); id at
3026-42 (discussing H.R. Res. 127 on June 8).
234 Id. at 3041-42.
235 Id at 3055.
226 /d. at 3144 '19.
237 Id at 3148.
235 id at 3149.
239 Joint Resolution Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, No. 48,
14 Stat. 358 (1866).
24° 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS., S. JOURNAL 563 (1866).
241 Id.
242 See Colby, supra note 16, at 1666.
243 Proclamation No. 13,15 Stat. 708,709-710 (1868).
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1. Section 1 of the April 21 Proposal, Which Became Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment
Section 1 of the April 21 proposal in the Committee said: "No
discrimination shall be made by any state, nor by the United States, as to
the civil rights of persons because of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude."' The Committee revised this sentence substantially before
submitting it to Congress. As introduced in Congress, the proposal said:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.'
Two features of the revision in the Committee deserve mention. First,
as the text shows, the Committee decided to drop all mention of race.
Professor Earl Maltz has observed that this specific change has had
sweeping consequences, allowing courts to apply the Equal Protection
clause to address many forms of discrimination and not just racial
discrimination.' Second, the revised version sounds very much like H.R.
Res. 63, but does not say anything about the powers of Congress.
The House approved H.R. Res. 127 as it was introduced. But the
Senate added an initial sentence declaring all persons born in the United
States to be U.S. citizens.' Senator Howard and others discussed the
purpose, meaning, and limitations of this amendment to the proposal on
May 30.248 The sentence had the effect of overruling the Supreme Court's
decision in Dred Scott that persons of African descent could never be
citizens.' Senator Revardy Johnson, who as an attorney had represented
John Sanford against Dred Scott before the Supreme Court," supported
the amendment.' Without discussing his former role in the matter, he
subtly mentioned that "serious questions have arisen, and some of them
have given rise to embarrassments, as to who are citizens of the United
States, and what are the rights which belong to them as such; and the object
of this amendment is to settle that question."' When the matter came
before the House, Representative Stevens merely commented: "This is an
excellent amendment, long needed to settle conflicting decisions between

KENDRICK, supra note 37, at 83.
GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2286.
246 Earl M. Maltz, Moving Beyond Race: The Joint Committee on Reconstruction and the
Drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 287, 297-98 (2015).
247 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
248 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2890--95.
249 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 457 (1856), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
250
CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2893; see Dred Scott, 60 'U.S. at 399 (identifying "Mr.
244

245 CONG.

Johnson" as counsel for the defendant in error).
251 CONG.
252

Id.

GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2893.
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the several States and the United States."'
2. Section 2 of the Committee's April 21 Proposal, Which Was
Deleted by the Committee and Not Included in the Fourteenth
Amendment
Section 2 of the April 21 proposal would have banned racial
discrimination with respect to the right to vote. The proposal said:
From and after the fourth day of July, in the year one
thousand eight hundred and seventy-six, no discrimination
shall be made by any state, nor by the United States, as to
the enjoyment by classes of persons of the right of suffrage,
because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.'
The Joint Committee, however, deleted the original section 2. Because
the Journal does not record committee discussions, the reasons for deleting
this provision are lost to history. Voting discrimination became a subject
that ultimately would be addressed by the Fifteenth Amendment."
3. Section 3 of the April 21 Proposal, Which Became Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment
Section 3 of the April 21 committee proposal addressed representation
in Congress and was very similar to H.R. Res. 51. It said:
Until the fourth day of July, one thousand eight hundred and
seventy-six, no class of persons, as to the right of any of
whom to suffrage discrimination shall be made by any state,
because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude,
shall be included in the basis of representation.256
The Committee undertook various changes to this proposal and
renumbered it to be section 2. As introduced into Congress, the new
section 2 read as follows:
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States which may be included within this Union according
to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of
persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But
whenever in any State the elective franchise shall be denied
to any portion of its male citizens not less than twenty-one
years of age, or in any way abridged, except for participation

253

Id at 3148.

KENDRICK, supra note 37, at 83-84.
255 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not

254

be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude."). That said, it should be noted that Senator Henderson introduced a proposal,
SR. No. 23, on January 23,1866, that would have amended the Constitution to prohibit discrimination
in voting: "No State, in prescribing the qualifications requisite for electors therein, shall discriminate
against any person on account of color or race." CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 362.
256 See KENDRICK, supra note 37, at 84.
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in rebellion or other crime, the basis of representation in such
State shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of such male
citizens not less than twenty-one years of age.257
This language is very similar to the language in H.R. Res. 51, but it is
more detailed. The House approved the language without change, but the
Senate revised it. The following marked paragraph shows the difference
between the initial version of H.R. Res. 127 and the final version approved
by both Houses (with deleted text stricken and new text underlined):
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
Estates which may be included within this Union according
to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of
persons in each Estate, excluding Indians not taxed. But
whenever, in any State, the elective franchise shall be denied
to any portion of its male citizens not less than when the right
to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President
and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in
Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a state, or the
members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the
male inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of
age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way
abridged, except for participation in rebellion., or other
crime, the basis of representation in such State therein shall
be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male
citizens shall bear to the whole number of sueit-male citizens
not less than twenty-one years of age in such state 258
The changes to the first sentence appear to be purely stylistic, as are
some of the changes in the second sentence. But the second sentence also
differs substantively. Senator Williams, who proposed the amendment,
thought it would be preferable for the section to specify "particularly the
officers for which these people must be allowed to vote in order to be
counted."' The Senate discussed the whole issue of representation at
length on June 8 before approving the amended version.' When the
Senate's revisions came back to the House for approval, Representative
Stevens did not object to the changes but expressed disappointment that
the joint resolution did not go further and ban discrimination in voting (as
section 2 of the original April 21 proposal would have done).261
4. A New Section, Which Was Not Included in the April 21 Proposal
and Which Became Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment
President Johnson's proclamations regarding the reconstruction of
CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2286.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
259 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 3029.
257

258

260
261

See id. at 3026-40.
See id. at 3148.
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former Confederate states allowed most former Confederate supporters to
vote so long as they took a loyalty oath. The constitutional amendments
proposed in H.R. Res. 9, No. 51, and No. 63 did not address this issue of
former Confederate officials. The initial April 21 proposal in the Joint
Committee also contained no provision on the subject. But the issue arose
again after the Joint Committee deleted the original section 2, and
renumbered the original section 3 to be section 2. On April 28,
Representative Williams proposed the following new provision, which
became section 3 of the Committee's proposal when it was introduced into
the House:
Until the 4th day of July, in the year 1870, all persons who
voluntarily adhered to the late insurrection, giving it aid and
comfort, shall be excluded from the right to vote for
Representatives in Congress and for electors for President
and Vice-President of the United States.262
The House did not make any changes to this provision when it passed
H.R. Res. 127. The Senate, however, approved a substantial revision of it
to say:
That no person shall be a Senator or Representative in
Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold
any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under
any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States,
or as a member of any State Legislature, or as an executive
or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of
the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or
rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the
enemies thereof. But Congress may, by a vote of two thirds
of each House, remove such disability.263
This modification switched the focus from voting to limiting the
ability to serve in state or federal office. The new language was proposed
on May 30,264 and discussed the same day.265 Senator Johnson thought that
it was better than the committee's original proposal of disenfranchisement.
He said:
I am opposed to the amendment as proposed by the
committee . . . . All history shows, as I think, that on the
conclusion of a civil war, the more mild . . . the measures are
which are adopted the better for the restoration of entire
peace and harmony.266

See KENDRICK, supra note 37, at 116.
GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2897.
264 Id.
265 Id at 2897 2902.
266
1d. at 2898.

262

263 CONG.
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He complained that the committee's original proposal would
disenfranchise "nine tenths, perhaps, of the gentlemen of the South."267
When the revision came back to the House, Representative Stevens
said: "This I cannot look upon as an improvement. It opens the elective
franchise to such as the States choose to admit. In my judgment, it
endangers the Government."5268 Despite his reservations, he still urged the
House to approved H.R. Res. 127 as modified by the Senate. "[L]et us no
longer delay; take what we can get now," he said, "and hope for better
things in future legislation."269
5. Section 4 of the April 21 Proposal, Which Became Section 4 of the
Fourteenth Amendment
Section 4 of the original April 21 proposal resembled H.R. Res. 9. It
concerned payment of Confederate debts and payments for the
emancipation of slaves. It said that "[d]ebts incurred in aid of insurrection
or of war against the Union, and claims of compensation for loss of
involuntary service or labor, shall not be paid by any state nor by the
United States."' The committee modified the language before sending
this version to Congress as section 4 of H.R. Res. 127:
Neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay
any debt or obligation already incurred, or which may
hereafter be incurred, in aid of insurrection or of war against
the United States, or any claim for compensation for loss of
involuntary service or labor. 271
The House passed this version without making any changes. The
Senate discussed section 4 at length on June 4.272 That same day, Senator
Howard suggested revisions, which included changing the last clause to
read "any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such
debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal and void."273 The
debates contain little explanation for these minor revisions. When the
matter returned to the House, Representative Stevens had no issues with
the Senate's amendments to section 4.274
6. Section 5 of the April 21 Proposal, Which Became Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment
Section 5 of the April 21 proposal read: "Congress shall have power
to enforce by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."275 This
section resembled H.R. Res. 63 in that it sought to give additional
267 m
2" Id
269 a
270

at 3148.

See KENDRICK, supra note 37, at 84.

271 CoNG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2286.

at 2938.
Id at 2941.
274 Id. at 3148.
275 KENDRICK, supra note 37, at 84.
272 id.
273
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legislative power to Congress but was more limited. Rather than granting
Congress a general power to protect life, liberty, and property, section 5
provides authority limited to enforcing the provisions of the amendment.
As the Supreme Court explained in City of Boerne v. Flores,' "[u]nder
the revised Amendment, Congress' power was no longer plenary [i.e., as
it would have been under H.R. Res. 63] but remedial. Congress was
granted the power to make the substantive constitutional prohibitions
against the States effective."277
The April 21 proposal made it through the Joint Committee and both
the Senate and the House with only stylistic changes (adding "The" before
"Congress" and a comma after "enforce").278 In the House, Representative
Bingham discussed the protections of the first section and then with
apparent reference to the fifth section explained that the amendment would
empower Congress "to protect by national law the privileges and
immunities of all the citizens of the Republic . . . whenever the same shall
be abridged or denied by the unconstitutional acts of any State."' Senator
Howard said that section 5 "enables Congress, in case the States shall enact
laws in conflict with the principles of the amendment, to correct that
legislation by a formal congressional enactment.',280
IV. DEFINITIONS OF ORIGINAL MEANING AND THE LIMITED RELEVANCE
OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

In discussions of the "original meaning" of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the term "original meaning" may refer to at least three
distinct kinds of meaning. The term "original intent of Congress" (or
"original intent") typically refers to the meaning that the members of the
39th Congress collectively intended the Amendment to have. The
"original understanding of the ratifiers" (or "original understanding"), in
contrast, is the meaning that the state legislatures actually understood the
Fourteenth Amendment to have when they approved and ratified the
Amendment. And the "original objective meaning" (or "original public
meaning") is the meaning that a reasonable person would have attached to
the words of the Amendment when the Amendment became effective.
In some cases, the original intent, the original understanding, and
original objective meaning are one and the same. For a simple hypothetical
example, consider section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The last
sentence of this section says Congress may remove a former Confederate's
disability from holding office by a vote of two-thirds of "each House."
Evidence may show that the 39th Congress intended the quoted term to
refer to the Senate and the House of Representatives, that the state
legislatures understood the quoted term to have the same meaning, and
that a reasonable person would also have understood the quoted term in
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
Id. at 522.
278 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
279 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 24, at 2542.
280 Id. at 2768.
276

277
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the same way.
But the original intent, the original understanding, and the original
objective meaning may diverge on particular issues. As another
hypothetical example, consider the term "privileges or immunities" in
section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Statements by members of the
House and Senate may show that Congress intended the quoted term to
refer to the specific privileges and immunities discussed in Justice
Bushrod Washington's circuit court opinion in Corfield v. Coryell.' But
evidence of debates in the state legislatures may show that those
legislatures actually understood the term to refer only to the privileges or
immunities identified in the Bill of Rights. And objective evidence
showing the customary usage of such words might show that a reasonable
person of the era would have interpreted the term to refer to all privileges
and immunities secured by federal laws.
These distinctions are important because when jurists and scholars cite
the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, they are generally
attempting to discern the original intent of Congress rather than the
original understanding of the state legislatures or original objective
meaning. The Congressional Globe, the Journal and Report of the Joint
Committee, and the House and Senate Journals typically yield clues about
what members of Congress were thinking in December of 1865 and in the
spring of 1866. The legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment has
less relevance in establishing the original understanding of the state
legislatures and the original objective meaning. What appears in the
Congressional Globe and similar documents is not a record of what state
legislatures understood the Fourteenth Amendment to mean, and do not
necessarily show how a reasonable person would have understood the
Amendment's text. The best evidence of those meanings would come from
other sources not discussed in this Article. For example, records of the
debates within the state legislatures might show how the legislatures
understood the amendment. And dictionaries from the 1860s and similar
sources might show how a reasonable person would have interpreted the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Although the distinction among types of original meaning may sound
academic, the subject is very important when discussing the Fourteenth
Amendment. The legislative history contains evidence showing that
Congress attached (or may have attached) meanings to H.R. Res. 127 that
likely would not have been evident to state legislatures and reasonable
members of the public. For example, as noted above, Justice Black
concluded that Congress intended the Due Process Clause to incorporate
the substantive protections of the Bill of Rights.' Statements by

281 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). This was a decision from the Circuit Court in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania that was decided by Justice Washington while he was riding circuit. Id at
551-52.
282 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting), overruled in part,
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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Representative Bingham and others may support this view. But these
statements at best help to prove the original intent. They do not show the
original understanding of the state legislatures or original objective
meaning of the words "due process."283
Eminent writers have taken different views on which type of original
meaning of the Constitution is most important.'" Resolution of this
interesting debate is beyond the scope of this Article. Regardless of whose
view on the subject is best supported, writers who rely on the legislative
history of the Fourteenth Amendment to make claims about the
Amendment's original meaning should recognize that their arguments are
primarily about the original intent of Congress. The legislative documents
show what members of Congress wanted the Amendment to mean.
The legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, is not
irrelevant in determining the original objective meaning of its text. The
numerous Congressional documents provide what has been called
"publicly available context of constitutional communication." They
show how people in 1866 talked about the subjects covered by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Thomas's opinion in McDonald v. City of
Chicago provides an example. Justice Thomas began his discussion of the
original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities clause with this
statement: "When interpreting constitutional text, the goal is to discern the
most likely public understanding of a particular provision at the time it
was adopted."286 Justice Thomas then had to explain how citing statements
from the legislative history could help to show this objective meaning. His
nuanced argument shows that, while such statements may not always
provide strong evidence of the original public meaning, they might have
relevance in some circumstances. Justice Thomas wrote:
Statements by legislators can assist in this process [i.e., the
process of discerning the original public meaning] to the
extent they demonstrate the manner in which the public used
or understood a particular word or phrase. They can further
'Lawrence Rosenthal, The New Originalism Meets the Fourteenth Amendment: Original
Public Meaning and the Problem of Incorporation, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 361, 362-65 (2009)
(discussing how the intent of the Congress may not correspond to the original public meaning).
284 Chief Justice John Marshall, for example, generally looked to the original intent of the
Framers of constitutional provisions in his opinions. See Gregory E. Maggs, Which Original Meaning
of the Constitution Matters to Justice Thomas?, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 494, 499 (2009). James
Madison, on the other hand, said that the original understanding of the ratifiers was more important.
Id. at 501--02. Justice Antonin Scalia asserted that courts should focus on the original objective
meaning. Id. at 502. And more recently Professors John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport have been
influential in arguing that courts should interpret the constitution according to the "original methods"
by which courts interpreted at the time of the Framing. John McGinnis & Michael Rappaport,
Interpreting the Constitution Through Original Methods Originalism, VoLoicu CONSPIRACY (Jan. 8,
2014, 9:00 AM), http://volokh.com/2014/01/08/interpreting-constitution-original-methodsoriginalism/ [https://perma.cc/DMC2-FDHJ].
285 Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1935,
1939 (2013).
286 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 828 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
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assist to the extent there is evidence that these statements
were disseminated to the public. In other words, this
evidence is useful not because it demonstrates what the
draftsmen of the text may have been thinking, but only
insofar as it illuminates what the public understood the
words chosen by the draftsmen to mean.287
The key in making this kind of argument is showing strong reasons
for believing that the public knew what transpired. For example, after
Justice Thomas cited a floor speech by John Bingham, he explained:
That speech was printed in pamphlet form, see Speech of
Hon. John A. Bingham, of Ohio, on the Civil Rights Bill,
Mar. 9, 1866 (CONG. GLOBE); see 39th CONG. GLOBE 1837
(remarks of Rep. Lawrence) (noting that the speech was
"extensively published"), and the New York Times covered
the speech on its front page. Thirty—Ninth Congress, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 10, 1866, p. 1.288
And when Justice Thomas cited a floor speech by Senator Howard, he
noted: "News of Howard's speech was carried in major newspapers across
the country, including the New York Herald, see N.Y. Herald, May 24,
1866, p. 1, which was the best-selling paper in the Nation at that time."289
When this kind of evidence can supplement the legislative history, and
show that it may have influenced state legislators or public debate, claims
about the original objective meaning or original understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment are stronger.
An earlier example of using legislative history to determine the
original objective meaning appears in United States v. Wong Kim Ark.29°
In that case, the Court considered whether a child born in the United States,
of parents of Chinese descent, is a citizen under the first sentence of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' The Court considered statements by members
of Congress on the issue and concluded that they believed that such
children would be citizens.' The Court then addressed the distinction
between the original objective meaning and the original intent of Congress
as follows:
Doubtless, the intention of the congress which framed, and
of the states which adopted, this amendment of the
constitution, must be sought in the words of the amendment,
and the debates in congress are not admissible as evidence
to control the meaning of those words. But the statements
above quoted are valuable as contemporaneous opinions of
Id. at 828-29.
Id. at 831.
2" Id at 832.
287
2"

290 169 U.S. 649, 653 (1898).
291 Id. at 699.
292 Id at 674-75.
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jurists and statesmen upon the legal meaning of the words
themselves, and arc, at the least, interesting as showing that
the application of the amendment to the Chinese race was
considered and not overlooked.'
In other words, the Court believed that Citizenship Clause should be
interpreted according to its original objective meaning. It cited statements
by members of Congress not to discern their subjective intentions, but
instead to determine the legal meaning of the words as "jurists and
statesmen" would have interpreted them at the time.
V. TYPICAL METHODS OF USING THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO MAKE CLAIMS ABOUT ITS ORIGINAL
MEANING

Describing all of the different ways that jurists and scholars might use
the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment to make claims about
the Amendment's original meaning would be impossible. The ingenuity
of the legal mind in devising arguments from such documentary evidence
is limitless. But a summary of the most common approaches may be
helpful. The following discussion addresses five typical ways of basing
claims about the Fourteenth Amendment's original meaning on its
legislative history. Each section below describes a method, gives examples
of its use, analyzes strengths and weaknesses of the method, and suggests
practices that writers can use to make their claims employing that method
more persuasive.
A. Express Explanations
Jurists and scholars most commonly base claims about the original
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment on express explanations of H.R.
Res. 127 that appear in the legislative history. The theory behind this
approach, generally unstated, is that members of Congress heard,
understood, and accepted these explanations about the meaning of H.R.
Res. 127. And when they voted to approve H.R. Res. 127, they intended
the language to have the same meaning.
An example of this method of making a claim about the original
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment appears in Justice Powell's
concurring opinion in Fullilove v. Klutznick.' That case concerned the
scope of Congress's power under section 5 to enact a law that set aside
10% of certain funding for minority-owned businesses.' Section 5
provides: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article."296 Justice Powell concluded
from numerous statements by Representative Stevens, Senator Howard,
Id. at 699.
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 508 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
295 Id. at 453 (plurality opinion).
296 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.

293
294
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and others that Congress could use this power "to select reasonable
remedies" for "repairing the effects of discrimination."297 Justice Powell
cited statements in which speakers explained how Congress had discretion
in exercising its powers under section 5. Senator Howard and Senator
Poland, for instance, both described section 5 as giving Congress the
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's "principles," and
Representative Stevens described section 5 as granting a power "to correct
the unjust legislation of the States."298
Researchers can find express statements about the meaning of H.R.
Res. 127 in the Congressional Globe in nearly every discussion of H.R.
Res. 127 from May 10, when it was introduced into the House, until June
8, when the House approved the Senate's amendments. Additional
statements about H.R. Res. 127 appear in the appendix to Volume 36.
Unfortunately, as noted above, the Journal of the Joint Committee contains
no express statements by members of the Committee in committee
meetings about the meaning of the various provisions of H.R. Res. 127.
As explained above, the Journal records only official actions, such as
proposals, amendments, and votes, and does not preserve internal
committee debates.
The most commonly cited explanations of H.R. Res. 127 are found in
four passages: (1) Representative Stevens's section-by-section
introduction of H.R. Res. 127 to the House on May 8, 1866;2" (2) Senator
John Howard's section-by-section introduction of H.R. Res. 127 to the
Senate on May 23, 1866;3" (3) the Senate's discussion of proposed
amendments to H.R. Res. 127 on May 30, 1866;30' and (4) Representative
Stevens's explanation to the House on June 13, 1866, of the Senate's
amendments to H.R. Res. 127.302 Although researchers should not limit
themselves to these passages, they provide an excellent starting point for
discovering what Congress intended H.R. Res. 127 to mean.
Claims about Congress's intent in enacting the Fourteenth
Amendment that rely on a statement made during the debates over H.R.
Res. 127 often are subject to a straightforward objection: Just because a
Senator or Representative said something when debating the resolution
that became the Fourteenth Amendment does not mean that everyone
agreed with it. The statement may have been a unanimous view, a majority
view, a minority view, or even the view only of the speaker.
Writers can respond to this potential basis for impeaching claims that
rely on express explanations in three basic ways. First, writers can look for
additional supporting evidence in the legislative history. The more
statements made in support of a position, the more likely it was to hold a
297

Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 508--10 (Powell, J., concurring).
See id at 508-09 (quoting remarks from Sen. Howard, Sen. Poland, and Rep. Stevens in the
CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE).
299 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2459-60.
300 1d. at 2764-67.
3'Id. at 2890-2902.
302 See id. at 3148 (June 13, 1866).
298
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majority view.
Second, writers can look to see if any member of Congress objected
to the explanation upon which they are relying. A lack of objection may
suggest general agreement. For example, in Katzenbach v. Morgan,' the
Supreme Court considered the question whether Congress could restrict
literacy tests for voting using its power under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' The New York state attorney general argued that Congress
did not have this power because a court had not determined that the state
literacy test violated the Equal Protection Clause.305 But the Court rejected
this interpretation of section 5. It relied on Senator Howard's statement
that section 5 'casts upon Congress the responsibility of seeing to it, for
the future, that all the sections of the amendment are carried out in good
faith.''306 Sensitive to the possible concern about whether other members
of Congress agreed with Senator Howard on this point, the Court
remarked, "This statement of § 5's purpose [by Senator Howard] was not
questioned by anyone in the course of the debate."' Justice Thomas used
similar reasoning in construing the Privileges or Immunities Clause. After
quoting statements indicating that the phrase referred to what Justice
Washington had said in Corfield v. Coryell,308 he added "no Member of
Congress refuted the notion that Washington's analysis in Corfield
undergirded the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause."' To be
sure, a lack of express objection to a statement does not necessarily mean
that everyone agreed. But it does add weight.
Third, when both supporters and opponents of a proposed legislative
measure make statements about the meaning of a proposition, writers
might argue that the statements of the supporters of the Amendment should
have more weight than the comments of opponents. This proposition rests
on the idea that, even if we cannot know for sure which arguments
persuaded the legislature, it was more likely to be the arguments of the
supporters because they represented the majority.
B. Comparison of Drafts
Writers also make claims about what Congress originally intended the
Fourteenth Amendment to mean based on comparisons of H.R. Res. 127
to H.R. Res. 9, No. 51, or No. 63 or based on comparisons of the final
version of H.R. Res. 127 to prior versions of H.R. Res. 127. The theory
behind this method is that a comparison of texts can yield context for
making inferences about meanings that Congress intended.
An example of comparing H.R. Res. 127 to another proposal for
303
384 U.S. 641 (1966).
'4 Id. at 643 47.
See id. at 648.
Id. at 648-49 n.8 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2768).
307 Id. at 648 n.8.
308 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 526 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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amending the Constitution appears in City of Boerne v. Flores. At issue
was how to interpret section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Supreme Court compared H.R. Res. 63 to section 5 of H.R. Res. 127. As
described above, H.R. Res. 63 would have given Congress plenary power
"to make laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure to all persons
in every state full protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty and
property."31° Congress did not approve H.R. Res. 63, but did approve H.R.
Res. 127, which gave Congress only the power "to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article."311 An inference from comparing
the two drafts is that Congress did not intend the Fourteenth Amendment
to have the broader plenary power that H.R. Res. 63 would have provided.
As the Court put it: "Under the revised Amendment, Congress' power was
no longer plenary but remedial."'
An example of comparing the final version of H.R. Res. 127 to an
earlier draft of H.R. Res. 127 appears in Davidson v. New Orleans.313 The
issue in that case was whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires a state government to pay just compensation when it
takes private property. Contrary to modern decisions, the Court inferred
that Congress had not intended a just compensation requirement.' The
Court relied on evidence that the Joint Committee considered but rejected
a proposal by Representative Bingham to amend section 1 to include a just
compensation requirement.' The Court said, "Mt must be remembered
that, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, the provision on that
subject (just compensation), in immediate juxtaposition in the fifth
amendment with the one we are now construing (due process), was left
out, and this (due process) was taken."' Years later, in dicta in Adamson
v. California,317 Justice Black drew a different conclusion from the
evidence. He concluded that Representative Bingham's proposed version
of section 1 was rejected because expressly stating a just compensation
clause was unnecessary. In his view, the deletion helped confirm "the
Framers thought that in the language they had included this protection
along with all the other protections of the Bill of Rights."ms
This example shows that a comparison of drafts does not always yield
unambiguous clues about what Congress intended in approving H.R. Res.
127. Writers therefore should explain their inferences as clearly as
possible—as the Court did in Davidson and Justice Black did in
Adamson—and anticipate possible alternative inferences. Given the
potential for ambiguity, writers also should look for additional bases for
KENDRICK, supra note 37, at 56.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
312 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 522 (1997).
313 96 U.S. 97 (1877).
314 Id at 105.
315 KENDRICK, supra note 37, at 85 (Apr. 21, 1866) (rejecting Rep. Bingham's proposal to amend
section 1 of the proposal that became H.R. Res. 127 by adding the phrase "nor take private property
for public use without just compensation").
316 Davidson, 96 U.S. at 105.
317 332 U.S. 46 (1947), overruled in part, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
310 Id. at 80 n.9 (Black, J., dissenting).
310
311
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supporting their claims about the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
C. Evidence of Purpose
Writers also sometimes base claims about the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment on evidence of Congress's purpose in approving
H.R. Res. 127. The legislative debates contain many statements about the
goals of Congress in approving H.R. Res. 127. For instance, Senator
Howard explained that the purpose of the first sentence of section l was
to eliminate doubt caused by the Dred Scott decision on the issue of
citizenship. He said: "It settles the great question of citizenship and
removes all doubt as to what persons are or are not citizens of the United
States."319 In this statement Senator Howard is not explaining the meaning
of the first sentence of section 1, but instead the purpose that the first
sentence serves.
Over the years many scholars have debated the weight that judges
interpreting a legislative measure should give to the purpose of the
legislature that enacted it. Professors Henry M. Hart Jr. and Albert M.
Sacks prominently supported the "purposive" school of statutory
interpretation. They advocated that courts should determine "what purpose
ought to be attributed to the statute" and then "interpret the words of the
statute immediately in question so as to carry out the purpose as best it
can."320 In contrast, the textualist school of statutory interpretation,
typified by Justice Antonin Scalia, holds that the objective meaning of the
language used in legislative measures controls; courts generally are not to
depart from the objective meaning merely based on legislative purpose.
Justice Scalia wrote:
To be a textualist in good standing, one need not be too dull
to perceive the broader social purposes that a statute is
designed . . . to serve; or too hide-bound to realize that new
times require new laws. One need only hold the belief that
judges have no authority to pursue those broader purposes
or write those new laws.321
Regardless of which side of the debate has the better argument, it is
indisputable that the Supreme Court sometimes has looked to the
legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment for evidence of its
purpose and then used the purpose to decide issues. An excellent example
is Strauder v. West Virginia.' In that case, the Supreme Court considered
whether a state law that only permitted "white male persons" to serve on

CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2890, 2896 (May 30, 1866).
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1374 (William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
321 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 23
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
322 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
319

320
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a jury violated the Fourteenth Amendment.323 The Court expressly
endorsed a purposive interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, saying
that the Amendment "is to be construed liberally, to carry out the purposes
of its framers."3' Quoting its recent decision in the Slaughter-house
Cases,' the Court declared that "the one pervading purpose" of the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendment was "the freedom of the
slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the
protection of the newly made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of
those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over them."326
Because the law limiting jury service to white males discriminated on the
basis of race, the Court concluded that it was unconstitutiona1.327
The Strauder Court's holding with respect to racial discrimination in
eligibility to serve on juries remains valid today. But the Court did not
limit its remarks to this specific issue. The Court also discussed in dicta
the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to other forms of
discrimination in jury eligibility. The Court said:
[State law] may confine the selection to males, to
freeholders, to citizens, to persons within certain ages, or to
persons having educational qualifications. We do not believe
the Fourteenth Amendment was ever intended to prohibit
this. Looking at its history, it is clear it had no such purpose.
Its aim was against discrimination because of race or
color.328
This dicta, some of which the Supreme Court has since repudiated,329 also
is an example of purposive interpretation. The Court's statements rest on
the logic that the Equal Protection clause does not prohibit discrimination
against women, for example, because the purpose was to prevent
discrimination on the basis of race.
This final example pointedly shows that claims about the Fourteenth
Amendment based on purpose may be more controversial than claims that
rest on explanations of the meaning of H.R. Res. 127 or a comparison of
the final text of H.R. Res. 127 to the text of prior proposals. Even if the
legislative history supports conclusions about the purpose of a provision,
opponents may charge that purposive interpretation is improper.33° They
323 Id. at 305.
Id. at 307.
325 Slaughter-house Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
326
Strauder, 100 U.S. at 307 (quoting the Slaughter-house Cases). The Court in the Slaughterhouse Cases apparently did not think it was necessary to cite specific passages in the legislative history
to establish this purpose, saying that the events motivating them arc "almost too recent to be called
history, but which are familiar to us all." Slaughter-house Cases, 83 U.S. at 71.
327 Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308.
328 Id. at 310.
329 See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975) (holding that states cannot exclude
women as a class from serving on juries).
330 E.g., John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287, 1290 (2010)
("[T]extualism emphasizes that judges . .. have a duty to enforce clearly worded statutes as written,
324
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may assert, for example, that nothing in the text of section 1 limits the
guarantee of equal protection to matters of race and not of sex, and judges
cannot legitimately rewrite the text based on purpose.
Writers often disagree about the level of generality at which to identify
Congress's purpose. For example, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co.,' the Supreme Court considered whether a municipal program that
gave contracting preferences to minority-owned businesses violated the
Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Marshall asserted in dissent that they did
not. Making a claim about original meaning based on Congress's evident
purpose, he wrote:
Congress' concern in passing the Reconstruction
Amendments, and particularly their congressional
authorization provisions, was that States would not
adequately respond to racial violence or discrimination
against newly freed slaves. To interpret any aspect of these
Amendments as proscribing state remedial responses to
these very problems turns the Amendments on their heads.'
The majority saw a more general purpose, namely, preventing unequal
treatment. The majority said, with emphasis: "The Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that In]o State shall . . .
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.'"333 The Court observed that favoring any one group of contractors
would harm others. The Court thus concluded that all racial
discrimination, whether aimed at helping or hanning minorities, must be
subjected to strict scrutiny.334
Writers should take this potential ground of impeachment into account
by acknowledging all possible purposes and then expressly addressing
why they are choosing one over the others. Judge Robert Bork took this
approach in discussing the Brown v. Board of Education335 decision from
an originalist perspective. He acknowledged that "[t]he ratifiers [of the
Fourteenth Amendment] probably assumed that segregation was
consistent with equality but they were not addressing segregation."336 In
other words, their purpose was not to end segregation. But they also had
another purpose. Judge Bork wrote, "The text itself demonstrates that the
equality under law was the primary goal."" What should be done in this
situation? Judge Bork said that when there is a conflict between the
primary purpose and some other purpose, the primary purpose must
even if there is reason to believe that the text may not perfectly capture the .. . purposes that inspired
their enactment.").
33 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
332
Id. at 559 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
33 Id. at 493.
334 Id.
336

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
ROBERT H. BORIC, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 82

(1990).
37
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prevail. He explained: "By 1954, when Brown came up for decision, it had
been apparent for some time that segregation rarely if ever produced
equality. . . . Since equality and segregation were mutually inconsistent,
though the ratifiers did not understand that, both could not be honored."338
D. Silence
Writers sometimes rely on silence in the legislative history of the
Fourteenth Amendment when making claims about what Congress
originally intended the Amendment to mean. The theory appears to be that
the House and Senate thoroughly discussed H.R. Res. 127 before voting
to approve it, and it is therefore unlikely that Congress intended the
Fourteenth Amendment to have a meaning that the representatives and
senators never mentioned. One example of this type of reasoning appears
in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.' In that case, a white
applicant claimed a state university's consideration of race in its medical
school admissions process violated the Equal Protection clause. Justice
Brennan wrote an opinion, joined by three others, in which he concluded
that the admissions policy was constitutional even though it was not race
neutral. Justice Brennan relied in part on silence in the legislative history
in rejecting the applicant's claim. He wrote:
Nothing whatever in the legislative history of either the
Fourteenth Amendment or the Civil Rights Acts even
remotely suggests that the States are foreclosed from
furthering the fundamental purpose of equal opportunity to
which the Amendment and those Acts are addressed. . . . We
therefore conclude that [the university's] goal of admitting
minority students disadvantaged by the effects of past
discrimination is sufficiently important to justify use of raceconscious admissions criteria.'
Although arguments from silence have some strength, they invite
three counterarguments. First, these arguments rest on the questionable
premise that the legislative history contains complete evidence of what
Congress intended the Fourteenth Amendment to mean. But we know that
the legislative history is incomplete. The Journal of the Joint Committee,
for example, does not contain any record of the Committee's debates.
Maybe a member of the Committee said something relevant to the issue in
Bakke but the remark has been lost to history. In addition, as described
above, the House and Senate debated H.R. Res. 127 in haste, discussing
its many provisions on only a handful of days. Their conversations were
not as extensive as they might have been.
Second, arguments from silence may rest on the questionable premise
that Congress intended the Fourteenth Amendment to achieve specific
results rather than to establish generally applicable principles. In The Path
338

Id

339

438 U.S. 265 (1978).

34° Id. at 368-69 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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of the Law, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes offered this instructive tale:
There is a story of a Vermont justice of the peace before
whom a suit was brought by one farmer against another for
breaking a chum. The justice took time to consider, and then
said that he ha[d] looked through the statutes and could find
nothing about chums, and gave judgment for the
defendant.'
The lesson of this tale is that the hypothetical justice failed to see that
a general principle (i.e., a defendant may be liable for damaging the
property of another) may apply to new circumstances (i.e., broken chums)
even if no one previously thought to discuss those specific circumstances.
Similarly, a critic of the plurality's reasoning in Bakke might argue that
discrimination against a white medical school applicant may violate the
general principle of Equal Protection even if no one specifically discussed
this kind of discrimination during debates over H.R. Res. 127.
Third, arguments about silence in the legislative history often can be
flipped around, showing that they are not very strong. For example,
suppose that the issue is whether the Equal Protection Clause prohibits
separate but equal high school locker rooms for boys and girls. Suppose
further that the legislative history is silent on the issue. One writer might
argue that separate but equal locker rooms are constitutional because no
representative or senator said that the Fourteenth Amendment would
prohibit them. But another writer might respond that having separate but
equal locker rooms is unconstitutional because no representative or
senator said the Fourteenth Amendment would allow them. Any writer
making an argument from silence should anticipate this kind of response.
E. Contemporaneous Congressional Actions
Jurists and scholars also sometimes base claims about what the 39th
Congress intended the Fourteenth Amendment to mean on evidence of
how the same Congress handled related matters.' This method rests on
the assumption that Congress would have wanted to act consistently
during the spring of 1866.343 One example appears in Justice Breyer' s
dissent in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. I.' In that case, Justice Breyer concluded that state laws
assigning children to attend public schools according to the children's race
for the purpose of promoting school integration did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause even if the busing was not directed solely at remedying
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 474 (1897).
For an impressive survey of actions taken by the Reconstruction Congress, see David P.
Currie, The Reconstruction Congress, 75 U. Cm. L. REV. 383 (2008).
This is akin to the First Congress canon, which is based on the premise that the actions of the
Framers and the "contemporaries of the Constitution" "provide unique insights" into its meaning.
Michael Bhargava, The First Congress Canon and the Supreme Court's Use of History, 94 CALIF. L.
REV. 1745, 1747 (2006).
aaa 551 U.S. 701, 803 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
saz
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past discrimination in school assignments." Justice Breyer supported his
conclusion by asserting:
There is reason to believe that those who drafted [the]
Amendment . . . would have understood the legal and
practical difference between the use of race-conscious
criteria . . to keep the races apart, and the use of raceconscious criteria . . . to bring the races together.'
He cited as evidence to support this claim various federal efforts to
ameliorate the conditions of former slaves during reconstruction.347 In
other words, Congress would not have intended the Fourteenth
Amendment to prohibit measures aimed at integrating African-Americans
because Congress itself undertook such measures.
This method of discerning the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment has the strength of relying on objective demonstrations of
Congress's intent. Actions often speak louder than words. Because
Congress enacted the Freedman's Bureau Act, we can conclude with
certainty that a majority of the House and Senate supported the Act's
provisions. In contrast, even if Senator Howard or Representative Stevens
gave a speech in which they clearly defined the meaning of terms in the
Fourteenth Amendment, no one can say for sure whether the rest of the
Senate or anyone in the House agreed with them. Congress votes to
support acts, but does not vote to support floor statements.
But this method has three potential weaknesses that proponents must
recognize and address. First, congressional actions taken before the
Fourteenth Amendment became effective do not necessarily indicate what
Congress intended the Fourteenth Amendment to permit. Congress may
have wanted the Fourteenth Amendment to impose new limitations on the
States. For example, prior to the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 protected only certain enumerated rights."
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment appears to have gone further in
its broadly stated Due Process, Equal Protection, and Privileges or
Immunities Clauses.'
Second, section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment by its terms limits
only the states and does not limit Congress. Congress may have thought
that it had power to take actions that the Fourteenth Amendment would
Id. at 803 -04, 820.
Id. at 829.
347 See id. at 829--30 (citing, among other things, RICHARD SEARS, A UTOPIAN EXPERIMENT IN
KENTUCKY: INTEGRATION AND SOCIAL EQUALITY AT BEREA, 1866-1904 (1996), and ROGER
FISCHER, THE SEGREGATION STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA 1862 77, at 51 (1974)).
This included the "rigbt. . . to make and enforce contracts, to sue" and be sued, "to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property; and to full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of person and property." Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27
(1866) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (1952)).
349
See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 721 (1989) ("Many of the Members of the
39th Congress viewed § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment as `constitutionalizing' and expanding the
protections of the 1866 Act ... .").
345

346
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preclude the states from taking.35° For example, Congress may have
believed that the Equal Protection clause would limit state governments in
ways that the Bill of Rights—which does not contain an express guarantee
of Equal Protection—would not. Congress, for example, might be able to
pass laws helping African Americans that states could not.351
Third, this method of making claims about the original meaning
usually relies on argument by analogy. Any claim by analogy necessarily
rests on an assumption that things which resemble each other in some ways
must resemble each other in another way.' Analogies are often helpful in
law; a First Amendment precedent that applies to flag burning might also
apply to defacing a state seal based on an analogy of flags to seals. But
every analogy must fail at some point because two things are never
completely the same.353 In Parents Involved in Community Schools,354 for
instance, Justice Breyer analogized the race conscious measures that the
39th Congress approved to the race conscious school assignments at
issue.355 Justice Breyer concluded that if Congress thought that the former
were lawful, then by analogy Congress would not have intended the
Fourteenth to prohibit the latter.356 But the measures are not identical.
Despite the similarities of the two practices, Congress may have seen
differences that it considered important. A stronger opinion would have
explained why the differences should not matter.
VI. GENERAL PROBLEMS TO AVOID
When writers rely on the legislative history of the Fourteenth
Amendment in making claims about its original meaning, they should take
into account all potential grounds upon which others might impeach their
reasoning. The preceding discussion of five different methods of using the
legislative history identified possible weaknesses of each method. What
follows is a discussion of three more general problems to avoid.
A. Overlooking Conflicting Evidence
One general problem is overlooking conflicting evidence. Justice
Antonin Scalia famously condemned efforts to use legislative history to
Justice Harlan's dissent in Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967), a case that dealt with
involuntary expatriation of citizens, raised this point. The Court held that Congress, like the states,
could not deprive citizenship from an unwilling citizen. Id. at 267. Justice Harlan wrote: "Nothing in
the debates, however, supports the Court's assertion that the clause was intended to deny Congress its
authority to expatriate unwilling citizens." Id. at 284 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
351 See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547,563-65 (1990) (granting deference to Congress
that would not be granted to states in determining the validity of race conscious measures), overruled
in part, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,226-27 (1995).
352 See W. WARD FEARNSIDE & WILLIAM B. HOLTHER, FALLACY: THE COUNTERFEIT OF
ARGUMENT 23 (1959) (explaining that reasoning by analogy will break down at some point because
the two things are not identical and therefore do not share all possible properties).
3" See id.
354 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
"5 Id. at 829-30 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
3S6 Id.
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discern the meaning of statutes in part because he believed that these
efforts are often selective.' In one opinion, he recounted that "Judge
Harold Leventhal used to describe the use of legislative history as the
equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads
of the guests for one's friends."' In other words, researchers look for
comments that support their position and ignore contradictory statements.
The same criticism may apply to claims about the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment that rely on a few apt statements in Volume 36 of
the Congressional Globe.359
Professor Charles Fairman advanced this type of criticism in his
influential article addressing the question of whether the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights.36° Professor Fairman
recognized that Senator Howard had said that "[t]he great object of the
first section of this amendment" is to make the guarantees of the first eight
amendments of the Constitution applicable to the states.' But Professor
Fairman questioned whether this choice comment was enough to prove the
original meaning. He remarked:
Here at last is a clear statement that the new privileges and
immunities clause is intended to incorporate the federal Bill
of Rights. For the first time, "the first eight amendments" are
specified. On this point Howard's statement seems full and
unequivocal. It must be given very serious consideration,
coming from the Senator who had the measure in charge.
The question then becomes: did the Senate agree, did the
House agree, did the State Legislatures that ratified the
Amendment agree, that this was what the clause meant?'
Professor Fairman recognized that Representative Bingham appeared
to share Senator Howard's view, but saw little evidence that others did.363
As Professor Fairman put it, "What is all. The rest of the evidence bore in
the opposite direction, or was indifferent."' Whether Professor Fairman
is correct in his conclusion is a topic of some debate.365 The important
point, though, is that the kind of criticism he raises—that a few comments
are not enough to prove original meaning—is something all people who
write about the Fourteenth Amendment must take into account.366
See SCALIA, supra note 321, at 35-36.
Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993).
359 See supra Section II.A.
36° Fairman, supra note 8, at 58.
361 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2766 (May 23, 1866).
362
Fairman, supra note 8, at 58.
357
358

363 Id.

Id. at 65.
See Pamela Brandwein, Dueling Histories.• Charles Fairman and William Crosskey
Reconstruct "Original Understanding,"30 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 289, 300 (1996) (describing the debate
over whether Professor Fairman's criticism of Justice Black was correct).
366 Justice Thomas took this point into account in his dissent in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489
(1999), a case that held that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibited the states from imposing durational residency requirement for public benefits. Id. at 503—
364

365
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The only way to avoid or defeat this kind of criticism is to conduct
thorough research and confront contrary evidence. Historical research
often yields ambiguities. In some cases, the researcher must determine and
explain which conclusions are best supported. Justice Kennedy illustrated
this approach in Alden v. Maine.' Although that case did not involve the
Fourteenth Amendment, it concerned an issue of original meaning.368 The
question in the case was whether the Constitution stripped the states of
their sovereign immunity.369 Justice Kennedy recognized that some
statements made during the ratification of the Constitution supported this
view, but he found the other side better supported.' After considering the
competing sources, he summarized:
In short, the scanty and equivocal evidence offered .
establishes no more than . . . that some members of the
founding generation disagreed with Hamilton, Madison,
Marshall, Iredell, and the only state conventions formally to
address the matter. The events leading to the adoption of the
Eleventh Amendment, however, make clear that the
individuals who believed the Constitution stripped the States
of their immunity from suit were at most a small minority.37'
Here, Justice Kennedy acknowledged contrary evidence but based his
conclusion on what appeared to be the majority view." When
evidence points in more than one direction, judges and scholars
usually should take this approach and should not overstate the
certainty of their conclusions.'

04. In arguing that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was meant to protect fundamental rights, not
public benefits, Justice Thomas cautiously relied on the drafters' statements only after providing other
supporting evidence, writing:
That Members of the 39th Congress appear to have endorsed the wisdom of Justice
Washington's opinion does not, standing alone, provide dispositive insight into
their understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities
Clause. Nevertheless, their repeated references to the Corfield decision, combined
with what appears to be the historical understanding of the Clause's operative
terms, supports the inference that, at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted, people understood that "privileges or immunities of citizens" were
fundamental rights, rather than every public benefit established by positive law.
Id. at 527 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
367
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 722-23 (1999).
368
See e.g., id. at 714 ("The Amendment confirms the promise implicit in the original document:
'The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.'").
369 Id at 759--60.
370
Id. at 726.
371

Id

372

Id.
Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967), the Court held that the Citizenship Clause prohibited
Congress from enacting a statute that involuntarily expatriated U.S. citizenship from those who voted
in a foreign election. Id at 267. The Court relied on Senator Howard's statement to show that the
purpose of the Amendment was "to put this question of citizenship . . beyond the legislative power,"
171 In
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B. Taking Statements out of Context
Another general problem to avoid is taking statements from the
legislative history out of context. The 39th Congress was busy during its
first session. As described above, Congress seriously considered four
proposals for constitutional amendments: H.R. Res. 9, H.R. Res. 51, H.R.
Res. 63, and H.R. Res. 127. Congress also passed the bill that became the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.37' Members of Congress made numerous
statements during debates about these provisions, and many of these
statements relate to subjects that the Fourteenth Amendment ultimately
addressed. But in the end, only H.R. Res. 127 received the requisite
approval and became the Fourteenth Amendment. Statements made during
debates over other matters, accordingly, provide only limited evidence of
what Congress intended the Fourteenth Amendment to mean.
Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's decision in Plyler v.
Doe.' That case concerned a Texas law that sought to exclude from
public schools certain children who were present in the state in violation
of immigration laws.' Advocates for the children argued that law
violated the Equal Protection Clause, but Texas responded that the Equal
Protection Clause does not apply to noncitizens who are not lawfully
present.377 The Equal Protection Clause says that no state shall "deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.'
Ruling against Texas, the Court concluded: "Congress, by using the phrase
`person within its jurisdiction,' sought expressly to ensure that the equal
protection of the laws was provided to the alien population.' To support
this claim about the original meaning, the Court quoted Representative
Bingham, who asked rhetorically: "Is it not essential to the unity of the
Government and the unity of the people that all persons, whether citizens
or strangers, within this land, shall have equal protection in every State in
this Union in the rights of life and liberty and property?,)380
A potential ground for impeaching the Court's reasoning on this point
is that Representative Bingham was not speaking about H.R. Res. 127, the
resolution that became the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead,
Representative Bingham was speaking about H.R. Res. 63, a differently
and Congress had no power to cause an involuntary forfeiture of citizenship. Id. at 263. Justice
Harlan's dissent provided another statement from Senator Howard that a person can cease to be a
citizen by "'the commission of some crime" to show that the Citizenship Clause left intact Congress's
power to cause an involuntary forfeiture of citizenship. Id. at 286 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting
CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2895). The Court recognized the "conflicting inferences" from the
legislative history and relied also on the text and purpose of the Clause and other precedents. Id. at
267 (majority opinion).
374 See supra text accompanying notes 102-109 (discussing passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1866).
375 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
376 Id at 205 -206.
377
1d. at 210.
378 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
379 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 214.
3g1) Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 1090).
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worded resolution that the House approved but the Senate did not.'
Unlike H.R. Res. 127, H.R. Res. 63 did not guarantee "equal protection of
the laws" but instead guaranteed "equal protection in the rights of life,
liberty and property."382 It is true that the two phrases dealt with similar
subject matters and may have had similar meanings. But the Court's
reasoning in Plyler is incomplete because it does not address this issue or
explain why it is looking at comments concerning H.R. Res. 63 instead of
comments concerning H.R. Res. 127. Without more explanation, the
relevance of Representative Bingham's statement is difficult to gauge and
does little to support the Court's conclusion.
Writers who rely on statements made during congressional debates to
make claims about the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment
should take two steps to strengthen their arguments. First, they should
identify the speaker whom they are quoting, the date on which the speaker
spoke, and the particular measure that the speaker was discussing. Second,
if the speaker was addressing a measure other than H.R. Res. 127 (or an
early draft of H.R. Res. 127), they also should explain in detail why the
speaker's statement may show what Congress intended when it approved
the final version of H.R. Res. 127. In Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court
omitted this second step.
C. Using Methodology Selectively
A third general problem to avoid is a selective or inconsistent use of
methods for making claims about the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Section V of this Article identified five methods for using
the legislative history to make claims about the original meaning: relying
on express statements about meaning, comparing drafts, looking at
purpose, drawing inferences from silence, and looking at other
contemporaneous actions?' Writers may be tempted to choose whichever
methods best support the claim that they wish to make without addressing
the other methods. Or they may rely on a method that they would not use
in other contexts.
For example, as explained above, writers sometimes based claims
about the original meaning on evidence of purpose or contemporary
actions of Congress.3" Justice Breyer took this approach in his dissent in
Parents Involved in Community Schools.' He concluded that the purpose
of the Fourteenth Amendment was to bring the races together, and that
assigning children to schools by race in order to promote diversity
therefore did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.' One question to
ask is whether other methods of relying on the legislative history would
produce the same result. A second question is whether Justice Breyer
The Court knew that Representative Bingham was addressing H.R. Res. 63, and erroneously
said that this resolution "was to become the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
382 See supra text accompanying note 209 (discussing quoting H.R. Res. 63).
383 See supra Section V.
See supra Section V.C, E.
a ss Parents Involved v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 803 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
386 Id. at 801-04.
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would use the same kind of purposive methodology in other Equal
Protection cases, such as those involving challenges to laws discriminating
against homosexuality. Although this example involves Justice Breyer, the
same questions could apply to anyone.
CONCLUSION
The legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment consists of
statements by Representatives and Senators, drafts of proposed
amendments, committee reports, and other materials. This Article has
outlined what might be considered a four-step process for using this
legislative history to make or assess claims about its original meaning. The
first step is to locate the pertinent sources—such as Volume 36 of the
Congressional Globe and the Journal of the Joint Committee—and to find
relevant evidence. Although the sources are now available online, this first
step is still difficult because those sources are not all electronically
searchable and because the process by which Congress ultimately
approved the text of what is now the Fourteenth Amendment is
complicated. This guide may provide some assistance in finding pertinent
information.
The second step is to become familiar with some of the background
necessary for understanding the legislative history. Many of the concerns
of Congress in 1865 and 1866 are not our concerns today, and it is difficult
to discern what the Senators and Representatives were seeking to
accomplish without first understanding the context in which they acted.
This guide has attempted to describe some of the concerns that motivated
Congress to address the topics in each section of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The third step is to make a claim about the original meaning using the
legislative history. As explained in some depth, writers have at least five
methods of using the legislative history to make claims. They may rely on
express statements, a comparison of drafts, evidence of purpose,
inferences from silence, or other contemporaneous official actions. But
other methods are also possible. A common theme, though, is that writers
can strengthen their claims by thoroughly explaining their assumptions,
inferences, and logic.
The fourth step is to consider whether there might be reasonable
grounds for impeaching a claim about the original meaning. Each of the
five methods discussed above has important strengths and weaknesses.
This guide also has discussed three general problems to avoid: ignoring
contrary evidence, taking comments out of context, and selectively using
particular methods for making claims about the original meaning.
Acknowledging and addressing possible weaknesses in claims about the
original meaning is better than ignoring them.
As noted at the start of this guide, the question of what the Fourteenth
Amendment originally meant is distinct from the question of whether
courts should follow the original meaning. This guide has addressed only
claims concerning the former question; the latter question is much debated
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and addressed elsewhere. Put simply, it is possible to be interested in
knowing the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment with or
without believing that original meaning still controls today.
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APPENDIX A: PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
This appendix contains the text of proposed constitutional
amendments that Congress considered between December 1865 and June
1866.
H.R. Res. 9
The House approved the following proposed constitutional
amendment by a two-thirds vote on December 19, 1865. The proposal did
not come to a vote in the Senate. It addressed payment of Confederate
debts, a subject ultimately covered by section 4 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
No tax, duty, or impost shall be laid, nor shall any
appropriation of money be made, by either the United States,
or any one of the States thereof, for the purpose of paying,
either in whole or in part, any debt, contract, or liability
whatsoever, incurred, made, or suffered by any one or more
of the States, or the people thereof, for the purpose of aiding
rebellion against the Constitution and laws of the United
States.387
H.R. Res. 51
The House approved this proposed amendment by a two-thirds vote
on January 31, 1866. The Senate voted on March 9 and the provision
received the support of a majority of the senators but less than the required
two-thirds. It addresses the subject of representation of the former
Confederate states in a Congress, a subject ultimately covered by section
2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States which may be included within this Union according
to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of
persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed; Provided,
That whenever the elective franchise shall be denied or
abridged in any State on account of race or color, all persons
of such race or color shall be excluded from the basis of
representation.'"
H.R. Res. 63
The House debated this proposed constitutional amendment
extensively in February 1866 but did not vote on it. The Senate did not
consider it. It addressed civil rights and the powers of Congress, subjects
ultimately covered by sections one and five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall
387 CONG.

GLOBE, supra note 27, at 84.

'Id. at 535.
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be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each
State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
States (Art. 4, Sec. 2), and to all persons in the several States
equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property
(5th Amendment).389
The Joint Committee's April 21 Draft of What Became H.R. Res. 127
Representative Stevens introduced the following five-part proposed
amendment to the Joint Committee on April 21, 1866. The Joint
Committee made a number of revisions before introducing it into the
House as H.R. Res. 127.
Sec. 1. No discrimination shall be made by any state, nor by
the United States, as to the civil rights of persons because of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Sec. 2. From and after the fourth day of July, in the year one
thousand eight hundred and seventy-six, no discrimination
shall be made by any state, nor by the United States, as to
the enjoyment by classes of persons of the right of suffrage,
because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Sec. 3. Until the fourth day of July, one thousand eight
hundred and seventy-six, no class of persons, as to the right
of any of whom to suffrage discrimination shall be made by
any state, because of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude, shall be included in the basis of representation.
Sec. 4. Debts incurred in aid of insurrection or of war against
the Union, and claims of compensation for loss of
involuntary service or labor, shall not be paid by any state
nor by the United States.
Sec. 5. Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.390
H.R. Res. 127 as Introduced into Congress
Representative Stevens introduced H.R. Res. 127 into the House on
behalf of the Joint Committee on April 30, 1866. The House passed it
without amendment on May 10.
Sec. 1. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.

" Id. at 1034.
See KENDRICK, supra note 37, at 83-84 .

3

390
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Sec. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among
the several States which may be included within this
Union, according to their respective numbers, counting the
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians
not taxed. But whenever, in any State, the elective franchise
shall be denied to any portion of its male citizens not less
than twenty-one years of age, or in any way abridged except
for participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of
representation in such State shall be reduced in the
proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear
to the whole number of male citizens not less than twentyone years of age.
Sec. 3. Until the 4th day of July, in the year 1870,
all persons who voluntarily adhered to the late insurrection,
giving it aid and comfort, shall be excluded
from the right to vote for Representatives in Congress, and
for electors for President and Vice President of the United
States.
Sec. 4. Neither the United States nor any State shall assume
or pay any debt or obligation already incurred, or which may
hereafter be incurred, in aid of insurrection or of war against
the United States, or any claim for compensation for loss of
involuntary service or labor.
Sec. 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.391
H.R. Res. 127 as Approved by the Senate and House and Then Ratified by
the States (thus Becoming the Fourteenth Amendment):
After the House approved H.R. Res. 127, the Senate modified it and
approved it by a two-thirds vote on June 8, 1866. The House then approved
the H.R. Res. 127 as amended on June 10, 1866. The President transmitted
the approved version to the states on June 2, 1866. The Secretary of State
certified that three-quarters of the states had ratified the proposal on July
28, 1868. It thus became the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof; are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the
391 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2286.
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several States according to their respective numbers,
counting the whole number of persons in each State,
excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at
any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice
President of the United States, Representatives in Congress,
the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members
of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except
for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of
representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the
whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in
such State.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in
Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold
any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under
any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States,
or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive
or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of
the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or
rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the
enemies thereof. But Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds
of each House, remove such disability.
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United
States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for
payment of pensions and bounties for services in
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be
questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall
assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of
insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such
debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.392

392

U.S. CONST. amend. X1V.
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APPENDIX B: TIMELINE
Apr. 8, 1864: The Senate approves S. Res. 16 (which became the
Thirteenth Amendment) by a vote of 38 to 6.
June 15, 1864: The House of Representatives initially defeats the
Thirteenth Amendment.
Jan. 31, 1865: The House of Representatives passes the Thirteenth
Amendment (S.J. Res. 16) by a vote of 119 to 56.
Feb. 1, 1865: President Abraham Lincoln signs a Joint Resolution
submitting the proposed Thirteenth Amendment to the states.
Apr. 9, 1865: Lee surrenders to Grant.
Apr. 15, 1865: Lincoln is assassinated.
Dec. 4, 1865: 39th Congress convenes
Dec. 18, 1865: Secretary of State William Seward issues a statement
verifying the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment.
Jan. 9, 1866: Joint Committee convenes.
Jan. 12, 1866: Joint Committee approves the draft of a constitutional
amendment proposed by Representative Conklin on
representation, and sends it to Congress where it is introduced as
H.R. Res. 51.
Feb. 4, 1866: Joint Committee approves the draft of a constitutional
amendment proposed by Representative Bingham granting
Congress the power to enforce privileges and immunities, and
sends it to Congress.
Feb. 28, 1866: Facing opposition, House postpones consideration of
Bingham amendment.
Mar. 27, 1866: Senate fails to pass Conklin amendment by two-thirds
vote.
Mar. 27, 1866: President Johnson vetoes Civil Rights Act of 1866.
Apr. 9, 1866: Congress overrides Johnson's veto of Civil Rights Act
of 1866.
Apr. 21, 1866: Joint Committee begins to discuss Representative
Owen's proposal for an amendment.
Joint Committee approves draft of Fourteenth
Apr. 28, 1866:
Amendment, based on the Owen Proposal, with amendments
proposed by Representative Bingham, and sends it to Congress.
May 30, 1866: Senate adds the first sentence to §1 on citizenship.
June 18, 1866: House and Senate jointly approve Fourteenth
Amendment.
June 25, 1866: Connecticut ratifies.
July 6, 1866: New Hampshire ratifies.
July 7, 1866: Tennessee ratifies.
Feb 7, 1867: Delaware rejects.
Mar. 2, 1867: Congress passes reconstruction acts requiring the states
to ratify in order to be readmitted to the union.
July 8, 1868: Louisiana and South Carolina ratify.
July 28, 1868: Secretary of State announces three-fourths of the states
have ratified.
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APPENDIX C: TABLE OF SPEAKERS
This table lists the representatives and senators who made comments
on the proposed constitutional amendments described in Section III.
Following each name is the starting page of each comment in Volume 36
of the Congressional Globe.

H.R. Res. 9
Rep. Bingham, John (Ohio): 86
Rep. Farnsworth, John F. (Ill.): 85
Rep. Hale, Robert S. (N.Y.): 86
Rep. Higby, William (Cal.): 86
Rep. Ingersoll, Ebon C. (Ill.): 86, 87
Rep. Johnson, Philip (Pa.): 86, 87
Rep. Niblack, William E. (Ind.): 86
Rep. Randall, Samuel J. (Pa.): 87
Rep. Rogers, Andrew (N.J.): 84, 85, 86, 87

Rep. Rousseau, Lovell H. (Ky.): 85
Rep. Shellabarger, Samuel (Ohio): 85, 86
Rep. Sloan, Ithamar C. (Wis.): 86
Rep. Smith, Green Clay (Ky.): 87
Rep. Stevens, Thaddeus (Pa.): 85
Rep. Wilson, James F. (Iowa): 84, 85, 86,
87
Rep. Wright, Edwin R. V. (N.J.): 87

H.R. Res. 51
Rep. Benjamin, John F. (Mo.): 535, 536
Rep. Raymond, Henry J. (N.Y.): 536-538
Rep. Schenck, Robert C. (Ohio): 535
Rep. Stevens, Thaddeus (Penn.) 536, 537
Rep. Thomas, J.L. (Maryland): App. 58
Sen. Anthony, Henry B. (R.I.): 964, 1285
Sen. Buckalew, Charles R. (Pa.): 957, 958,
959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965
Sen. Chandler, Zachariah (Mich.): 885
Sen. Clark, Daniel (N.H.): 831, 832, 833,
834, 835, 1284, 1287
Sen. Conness, John (Cal.): 1284
Sen. Cowan, Edgard (Pa.): 1285, 1286
Sen. Creswell, John A. (Md.): 1285
Sen. Davis, Garrett (Ky.): 1288
Sen. Doolittle, James R. (Wis.): 983, 984,
1232, 1287
Sen. Fessenden, William Pitt (Me.): 702,
703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 876, 965,
982, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990,
991, 1275, 1276, 1277, 1278, 1279,
1280, 1281
Sen. Henderson, John B. (Mo): 1283, App.
115
Sen. Hendricks, Thomas A. (Ind.): 876,
877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884,
885

Sen. Howe, Timothy 0. (Wis.): 886, 983,
984
Sen. Johnson, Revardy (Md.): 763, 764,
765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 984
Sen. Lane, Henry S. (Ind.): 736, 737, 738,
739, 740, 741, 742
Sen. McDougall, James A. (Cal.): 1282,
1283, 1287
Sen. Morrill, Lot M. (Me): App. 151
Sen. Pomeroy, Samuel C. (Kan.): 1180,
1181,1182,1183,1184
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